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PREFACE 
Genetic engineering is a rapidly developing field. It touches many facets of 
our economic and social future.  There is  thus a  need  to stay abreast of 
developments. This applies equally to the  public authorities, the different 
economic and social interest groups and, indeed, to society as a whole. 
Accordingly,  the  Economic  and  Social  Committee  of  the  European 
Communities organized a Colloquy on "The Safety Aspects of Recombinant 
DNA Work" in Brussels on 14 and 15  May 1981. The participants included 
representatives from the fields of  government, science, industry, trade unions, 
consumers, environmentalists, religious,  youth and women's groups. The 
discussions took place withjn an "information-exchange" framework.  No 
policy conclusions were drawn. It is hoped that the information provided in 
this way, and which is contained in this publication, will be of  assistance to the 
different European Institutions and interest groups in their future work. 
The  idea of the  Colloquy originated  within  the  Economic and Social 
Committee in an Opinion and Study drawn up at the end of 1980. The Study, 
which  describes  the  general  background  to  the  subject and sets  out  the 
Committee's initial views, is  provided in the Appendix. ESC  LIST OF PARTICIPANTS  5 
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Representing the cross-section of the socio-economic interests in  Europe, 
we, in the Economic and Social Committee, have always found dialogue and 
debate to be a valuable and constructive experience. It is our central role to act 
as a meeting point for the social partners at European level. We are therefore 
glad to be able to extend this approach to the biological sciences and to learn 
something of the influence they will have in economic and social activity in the 
future. 
If biotechnology emerged at a time in the 1970's when society's attitudes to 
scientific and technological development were already undergoing a funda-
mental change, with a questioning of development for its own sake and the 
preoccupation with possible negative effects, it was also a time when growing 
demands were being made for immediate practical, social benefits, for new 
industry, new sources of energy, solutions to environmental problems, raw 
materials, improvements in health, and the whole concept of "the quality(~( 
1{/.c". 
In the work of the Economic and Social Committee these concerns and 
questionings come through very clearly and consistently in recent years. They 
are  still  to  the  forefront  of our  minds.  Our  hopes  and  fears,  perhaps 
understandably, led us at times to expect too much, to look for panaceas for 
our pressing problems from the new biology, or on the other hand to see only 
in  it  a  detrimental  development  of scientific  knowledge.  But  a  realistic 
assessment is now needed so as to avoid these extreme viewpoints. Because of 
the future importance of biology, we now need a deeper understanding of  the 
main issues involved and their consequences for human society. 
We need to know realistically, or at least with some acceptable definition, 
what benefits to expect and within what timescales they will be available. We 
need a sound assessment of the risks involved. We need to know how these 
advances in science and technology can be handled to protect society's best IX  OPLNINCi SPITCHLS  1 :sc 
interest, and the rights and dignity of man. That is  the first  purpose of this 
meeting. 
At the same time, to create a climate in which the research and innovation 
processes  can  respond  with  maximum  effectiveness  to  society's  needs,  a 
broad social consensus is required. We need first of all to have a clear idea of 
our economic and social goals. We need a commitment to the research effort 
needed to achieve these goals. We need an agreed view on ethical questions. 
And we need appropriate guarantees against technical risks. It is our belief in 
the Economic and Social Committee that this meeting can contribute to this 
process. We hope in this way that it  will  be a particular help to public policy 
makers and administrators. to science and to industry. That is  our second 
aim. 
In  promoting a dialogue on these issues at European level. we do not wish 
to take away from the work of the different Community and national bodies 
which are active in  this field.  Rather it  is our hope that all  institutions and 
interests will  be able to benefit from this two-way flow of information which 
they can then use in  their respective future activities. 
At  a  more  general  level,  you  are  helping,  through  your  work,  in  the 
construction of Europe. To achieve it, it will demand courage and dedication 
to scientific investigation. We all hope that it will be a better Europe, a Europe 
to which this colloquy will have made its own significant contribution. I wish 
you every success. 
I have much pleasure in  declaring this colloquy now open. I.SC 
Mrs  Heuser, 
Chairman of the 
Colloquy: 
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The  work  of the  Economic and  Social  Committee  mostly  consists of 
pooling its members' knowledge, experience and interests in order to reach a 
consensus on certain key policy issues submitted to it and finding politically 
feasible ways o~getting Europe to work. We are not always totally successful 
in  this aim, either because the obstacles are too great or because special 
knowledge is  required before any decisions can be taken. 
Experts  are  a  help.  But  they  can  only  partially  remove  this  feeling  of 
uncertainty.  The  more  one  gets  into  a  contentious  issue,  the  more  one 
becomes sensitive about taking responsibility for something about which one 
has insufficient knowledge. 
The Economic and Social Committee became aware of this when it first 
tackled the question of genetic engineering.  When  it  finished  its  work  it 
thought that it was not proper for a body of  its kind to keep knowledge about 
such an important topic for the future restricted to a small handful of people. 
The decision to draw up a Study was unanimous, and there was also strong 
support for organising a hearing like the one we are holding today to gather 
further knowledge and debate questions which were still open. Our Study 
showed  us  that  we  should start  with  the  premise that genetic engineering 
today can no longer be considered merely as a method of  biological research. 
It has  been estimated that  in  my own country alone there are some one 
thousand research projects going on at present. As the European Community 
sees itself as being forced to run in a world-wide race as regards research and 
its industrial application and has set aside great chunks of its  budget for a 
research programme, we should ask ourselves whether the present optimism 
about  genetic  engineering  is  justified,  whether  the  cost/benefit  ratio  is 
reasonable and whether all possible risks have been considered. 
The question of the possibilities and risks of genetic engineering has, of 
course, been taken up and discussed many times by researcpers themselves. 
But  this  has still  not  prevented sensational  publicity from  having lasting 
consequences. Even if, after ten years experience of genetic engineering, we 
can believe that these fearsome scenarios will  not come about, we must still 
ask ourselves whether we can really always assume in the future that genetic 20  OPENINCi SPEECHES  ESC 
engineering work is harmless, that safety measures really are safe and that the 
human quest for knowledge will stop at ethical barriers. 
Mr Roseingrave has already said what the aim of  this colloquy is. For me it 
is particularly important that we air all our differences here, however diverse 
they may be. Our aim cannot be to "achieve" a common viewpoint. I should 
also like to note that this is the first international forum where scientists and 
socio-economic  groups  have  been  able  to  exchange  ideas  on  genetic 
engineering. PAPER  DEVELOPMENT POTENTIAL 
TOPIC A:  DEVELOPMENT POTENTIAL 
Mr Richards, 
Rapporteur: 
21 
It has been suggested)hat great new benefits will flow from the application 
of recombinant DNA technology. It is argued that these benefits will not just 
be new things but also newer ways of doing old things. To make an accurate 
assessment, the questions must be asked: what has already been achieved at 
scientific level, and when will these benefits become generally available to the 
public. 
The first  area of scientific advance is  in  the general field of health care, 
improving our ability to deal with disease. There are several categories of 
activity. Among the first of the new potential drug therapies to be the subject 
of  cloning and expression in bacteria, is human recombinant insulin. Work is 
well advanced. At least one company is developing a manufacturing process 
for human insulin in  both the United States and in  Europe.  Most people 
suffering from diabetes are dependent on daily supplies of  animal insulin. But 
sources of animal insulin are becoming more difficult to obtain. At the same 
time, it  is needed on a greater scale, particularly in developing countries. An 
alternative source is  therefore needed. It is  also hoped that human insulin, 
being the actual  human  hormone and  not an animal  hormone, which  is 
slightly different, would have fewer longer-term side effects. But this has yet to 
be proven. 
Human growth  hormone,  which  is  also very  important, has also  been 
successfully  made  in  bacteria.  At  present  it  can  only  be  obtained  with 
difficulty from human pituitary glands and is  therefore in  extremely short 
supply. Manufacturing processes are being set up in  both the United States 
and in Europe. Chemical testing is just beginning. Several other hormones are 
also  being  developed  which  will  help  to  tackle  diseases  which  could  not 
otherwise be handled, particularly in  the immunological area. 
Another important category is the combatting of virus disease. Some virus 
diseases  are just  inconveniences.  Others  are  of serious  economic  conse-
quences.  One example is  that of serum  hepatitis, caused  by  the virus of 22  DLVLLOPMLNT POlTNTIAL 
hepatitis B.  It is serious in that it exists worldwide. It has the peculiar property 
that it  is  present in a  large number of people who carry the disease in  their 
blood, but do  not  themselves show symptoms.  If their blood is  used for 
transfusion, or if they are in contact with other human beings who are not so 
infected, these people may get a  serious disease which can result in  death. 
There is  some scientific evidence  ~hich also suggests that people who are 
chronically  infected  with  this  virus  may  progress  towards  liver  cancer. 
Conventional approaches to produce a  vaccine for hepatitis B have failed. 
One of the reasons is that it has not proved possible to grow the virus in tissue 
culture outside the body. Without the new technologies, there would be little 
possibility of producing an  effective  vaccine. Two of the important viral 
antigens, which might form the basis of an effective vaccine, have already 
been cloned and expressed in  bacteria. 
Influenza is another virus disease which everyone has contracted at some 
time or another. It is  not serious for the individual. But its economic impact 
worldwide is enormous. It can also be lethal for the elderly. One of the major 
scientific problems which has to be overcome is that the disease can vary from 
year to year, the so-called serological variation.  In the case of at least one 
animal  influenza,  one of the  components of a  vaccine.  animal  influenza 
surface antigen, has been made and expressed in bacteria. It is also hoped to 
recombine the genetic material from different serological variants so as to 
produce an antigen which would form the basis for a more universal kind of 
vaccine. It is  not yet a scientific reality. 
Recombinant  DNA  processes  are also  being  used  to  develop  vaccines 
against rabies and foot-and-mouth disease in cattle. The first is lethal to those 
unfortunate enough to get it.  Foot-and-mouth disease is economically very 
important to the food industry. 
At a  time of growing pressure on the world's capacity to produce high-
quality foodstuffs, the new technologies will undoubtedly be of great value. 
Recombinant  DNA  technology  has  already  been  used  to  significantly 
improve one of the processes for making animal feeds  based on methane-
consuming  bacteria.  The  technology  has  also  been  used  to  produce  a 
sweetening agent which will be better and safer than saccharin. There will be 
other new therapies based on the natural human materials which will help to 
counteract stomach ulcers and various types of auto-immune disease. 
The Chairman of the Economic and Social Committee referred to several 
other important areas including the development of new energy sources. 
Here,  it  is  hoped  to  develop  techniques  which  will  have  two  important 
characteristics. Firstly, they will produce fewer waste products and therefore 
will  not pollute the environment. Secondly, they could also be specifically 
developed to utilize waste materials from other sources, or other plentiful 
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hoped to develop new means of fighting pollution from existing industrial 
·processes and also to develop industrial processes which will  produce less 
waste. 
The production of new varieties of plants and animals is another new area 
\Vhich is now beginning to attract serious attention. New plant varieties will be 
developed to produce higher yields and to grow in a wider range of climates. 
This may well be very important in areas of the world where, at present, crops 
can only be grown with great difficulty and with poor yields. 
Finally, there is the prospect, although it is only a prospect, of  being able to 
correct genetic abnormalities in people, animals and plants. The first kind of 
inherited diseases which are likely to be tackled using this technology are 
those such as sickle-cell anaemia and thalassemia. Advances are more likely in 
these areas because the technique can only be applied to problems where the 
scientific basis has already been analysed and understood. 
Having looked at the possible benefits, we must also ask ourselves: are there 
really  harmful  possibilities.  I  can  only  give  you  my  view  as  a  scientist. 
Following the early concerns expressed by the public and scientists about the 
possible dangers of  these technologies, a number of well-designed experiments 
were undertaken. They were carried out under highly-contained conditions in 
case there was some harmful aspect. They tested the possibility of making 
dangerous pathogens. Essentially the attempts failed. One of the reasons is 
that too little is  known about the scientific basis of pathogenicity. 
While I hope the discussion will focus on the potential future benefits, we 
must not forget that the absence of possible hazards has not been proven. 
Most scientists now consider that accidental harm is a very remote possibility. 
We do not know at the moment whether it  may be possible to do harm by 
intention. But at the present stage of knowledge, it is much more difficult to 
usc .recombinant DNA techniques to do harm than to do good. 
DISCUSSION 
Mr  Herbig: 
Dr Richards has given us a very comprehensive introduction. Undoubtedly 
there  are  positive  applications.  Yet  this  very  significant  potential  for 
introducing new products and processes is presented as a simple aggregation 
of technical possibilities. For example, it includes the production of new and 
better medicines to combat disease. 
Yet, it is not sufficient simply to use the new technology to combat existing 
ills.  The  sociological  and  environmental  causes  have  also  to  be  tackled. 
Similarly, the possibj.Jity of new plant strains reducing the problem of world 
hunger has been mentioned. Hunger is  also due to sociological factors. The 
technologies currently being developed by large undertakings in the industria-
lized countries arc not suited to the type of agricultural improvement and 
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progress should be looked at, not in  isolation, but in  the light of social 
requirements. 
Mr Stewart: 
It seems to me  misleading to state that the majority of diabetics need 
insulin. In many cases, it is contra-indicated because they produce their own 
insulin. Injecting external insulin only blocks their own production and makes 
it a hard drug. The suggestion that animal insulin might be in short supply is 
somewhat surprising if  we look at the number of pigs slaughtered annually. 
Mr Bonety: 
In  his  written paper, Dr Richards stressed the importance of a  debate 
between industry and the  public authorities. There is  however one major 
omission, the ultimate users of  the new technology. We live in a society where 
new  techniques  are  transformed  into  industrial  applications  and  then 
commercialized for financial profit, which does not always represent a gain 
for society. Since there is still a question mark on risk, it is essential to involve 
consumer organisations,  local  authorities, etc.  in  all  discussions  between 
science and industry. This is the only way to ensure that the public is properly 
informed and that adequate safety precautions are taken. 
Mr von der Decken: 
Is it enough that it should be more difficult to use genetic engineering for 
evil purposes than for good? History has shown that this is not sufficient to 
prevent the harmful application of technology. We must therefore face the 
question of  possible misuse and be prepared to take any measures necessary to 
prevent it. 
Mr Richards, Rapporteur: 
Most of  my time is devoted to doing things which will hopefully be useful to 
mankind. I spend little time worrying about possible harmful applications. 
However, I did mention at least one such possibility. Some kind of  pathogenic 
virus or bacterium might be created which we  do not have the means to 
control. We know that certain characteristics need to be present in order that 
bacterium might have some pathogenicity. But because the scientific basis of 
pathogenicity is  poorly understood, we do not a·t  present have the means to 
attempt to create such organisms. 
Another  case  would  be  interference  with  organisms  whose  genetic 
characteristics we did not understand. But there too, we have no means at 
present of attempting to intervene. 
I  agree with  Mr Herbig that we  should come to grips with  the general 
economic, social and environmental factors which are the source of much 
human discomfort. If he could identify ways in  which RONA technology 
could be used to alleviate broader societal problems, I am sure that scientists 
would be only to happy to apply them. However, a  realistic assessment of 
potential future applications can only be based on scientific achievements to 
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The  question  raised  by  Mr  Stewart  completely  confounds  me.  When 
Banting and Best discovered the therapeutic value of  insulin, I was not aware 
that they were in fact prescribing a therapy for diabetics which does them no 
good. My understanding of medical opinion is that insulin therapy can be very 
beneficial to people who would not otherwise be able to lead any kind of 
normal life. The future supply of  animal insulin and the relative cost of human 
insulin will  ultimately be determined by the economic process. Mr Stewart 
also questioned the relative therapeutic value of  human as opposed to animal 
insulin, as it differs only in one amino-acid. This is a scientific question which 
will  be answered in time. 
Mr Nau: 
I have three questions to put to Dr Richards. What leads him to believe that 
existing vaccines against hepatitis Bare not effective? Why did he not mention 
interferon? Could he specify the "other" hormones which have been cloned 
and expressed? 
Mr Richards,  Rapporteur: 
It is very remiss of me not to have mentioned interferon, but it has had so 
much publicity that I thought that everyone here would have already formed 
their own views.  Interferon has been cloned and expressed by at least six 
different groups both in industry and in academic laboratories. There have 
been some interesting surprises. We now have a range of interferons each of 
which may have some specific therapeutic value. We also have the means to 
make these interferons in significant amounts. Clinical studies are beginning, 
using recombinant interferon from different tissue sources. There have been 
many claims for its  enormous therapeutic value.  I  am  not aware of any 
demonstration to date that interferon will be an effective anti-cancer agent. 
There is  no doubt, however, that it is an effective anti-viral agent. 
To reply to your second point.  I do not think I said that the hepatitis B 
vaccine was not effective. What I did say was I do not think it has been of 
demonstrated effectiveness. Briefly, it is a vaccine which has been produced by 
purifying the surface antigen of  the hepatitis virus which exists in the blood of 
carriers. It has been available for some time, but  I am  not aware of any 
scientific results. Maybe Dr Gartland can tell us more of that. 
With regard to the other hormones which have been cloned and expressed, 
I can only mention those which are publicly known, since I am not involved in 
areas which  may still  be  confidential. These are somatostatin and alpha-
thymosin-1. There may be others. Perhaps Dr Gartland can bring us up to 
date on things in  the United States. 
Mr Gartland: 
In relation to the hepatitis B vaccine I am not aware ofthe current situation 
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On the question of  other hormones. there is also bovine growth hormone. I 
think that is about the current list. 
Mr Stewart: 
I  apologize  for  coming  back,  but  I  think  that  the  disagreement  with 
Dr Richards is  significant. He assured us that the normal economic process 
will determine whether human insulin is  manufactured in  large quantities. 
That is exactly what I am worried about. Pharmaceutical companies possess 
highly  sophisticated  and  effective  marketing techniques.  If a  firm  has  a 
monopoly. this can lead to the sale of products at substantial profits, without 
necessarily being of  genuine social benefit. Take, for example. the dangerous 
overuse  of antibiotics  in  many  countries  where  they  are  not  properly 
controlled. 
Mr Coutinho: 
The hepatitis B vaccine which is now being tested is made from blood from 
human carriers. There have been several results which show that it is effective. 
The important issue is  that. at the moment, the vaccine is  in  very limited 
supply. This means it will be expensive. As things stand at present, it is beyond 
the  reach  of the  Third  World  countries,  the  ones  who  need  it  most. If 
recombinant ON A offers another way of  produ~ing the vaccine, that would 
be an important step forward. 
Mr Fiers: 
There are clearly two types of  diabetes: juvenile diabetes and that affecting 
older age groups.  It  is  indisputable that those affected by the juvenile type 
have,  perhaps  as  a  result  of a  viral  infection,  a  deficiency  in  the  beta-
Langerhans cells  which  are  responsible for insulin synthesis.  It is  equally 
undeniable that countless lives have been saved by the development of  animal 
insulin  therapy.  The  future  availability  of  animal  insulin  is  indeed  an 
economic question to which I do not know the answer.  Nevertheless, it  is 
known  that  5  to  10 (i(  of these diabetes  patients  have an  immunological 
reaction  to  animal  insulin  whether  derived  from  pigs  or  cattle.  The 
development of human insulin is  extremely important in  these cases. Here, 
recombinant ON A offers the only means of producing sufficient quantities. 
To  claim  that  overdoses of insulin  will  ultimately  lead  to  addiction  is 
stretchi- ng the facts too far.  Research is  currently bei~g car·ried out in  many 
laboratories into the interactions of insulin and the receptors on the cells. At 
high concentrations, there is a reduction in insulin response. It is still an open 
question  in  scientific  circles  whether  this  is  in  fact  a  form  of negative 
cooperation or whether it is simply due to an artefact. Needless to say, that it is 
of little help to patients who are suffering from a serious form of diabetes. 
Hepatitis B is  a  significant problem for us, even more so for the Third 
World. Patients' blood is  clearly a  limited source for vaccine preparation. 
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must be inactivated. The tests to prove it so are extremely expensive. They 
must be carried out on animals like chimpanzees, a practice which m·ight be 
ethically questionable in  large-scale production. Recombinant DNA on the 
other hand offers a much cheaper way of obtaining adequate quantities of 
hepatitis B vaccine. However, the last word has not yet been spoken. Much of 
the  present  discussion  could  be  superseded  by  an  alternative  approach, 
making vaccines through the synthesis of small peptides. 
Mr Thorley: 
Current supplies of  animal insulin are obtained from the glands of  both pigs 
and cattle. There is  no doubt that over the next  15 to 20 years, the supply of 
these glands will  be  outstripped by  the number of people requiring insulin 
therapy throughout the world. Many diabetics in the Third World are not able 
to receive any kind of  therapy at the moment. As these countries develop, the 
demand for insulin will increase and the supply will  become inadequate. An 
alternative source is  needed.  Recombinant DNA appears to offer the best 
possibility. 
There are  undoubtedly  some  people  who  react  to  porcine  and  bovine 
insulin. In the case of  bovine insulin there are three amino-acid differences. It 
is  hoped to remove this difference by  making human insulin and thus make 
these people more responsive to therapy. 
Mr Owen: 
There are  possibly two stages in  the development of vaccines to combat 
hepatitis B. The ultimate stage is the complete eradication of the disease. But 
before that, and until the pool of people who carry the disease has gone, if it 
ever does, there may well be groups who require special protection. Reference 
has been made to older people. There are other groups which are particularly 
exposed to shedding blood. There are those who are operating in artificial-
kidney units.  In the prison service, prisoners fight and shed blood. Warders 
are similarly exposed. It also applies in the ambulance service. In schools for 
the mentally handicapped, children can break windows and cut themselves. 
We have had cases of hepatitis  in these circumstances. Thus, there may well 
be groups of workers who can benefit from the early development of limited 
supplies, whereas the final conquest of the disease is  much more distant. 
Mr Dunican: 
After 20  to 30  years research with  bacteria we  know in  great detail how 
these bacteria work. Yet  we  never had the tools to apply this knowledge to 
animal  or human  systems.  The development  of recombinant  DNA  now 
allows  us  to look very deeply into how  human systems work, to study the 
targets for various drugs, the targets which  may be influenced under stress 
conditions, how a disease actually works and the auto-immune system. This 
knowledge will, I think, in the future provide a way of devising new drugs in 
place of the empirical approach which has hitherto been used. This is one of 
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Mr Richards, Rapporteur: 
I am grateful to Prof. Dunican for having made that point. Probably the 
single  most important benefit  to emerge from  this  technology  is  the new 
ability  to analyse normal and abnormal  processes  in  human and animal 
physiology. There are hopes that  we  will  be able to understand the  basic 
cellular processes and to see  how they  work  both  in  normal  cells and in 
abnormal cells. It may explain what makes a cell become a tumor, or a cancer 
cell. We will have a very powerful means of  analysing the genetic mechanisms 
for the synthesis of proteins right down at the molecular level. PAPER  RISKS  AND RISKS ASSESSMENT 
TOPIC B:  RISKS AND RISKS ASSESSMENT 
Mr K.  Gibson, 
Rapporteur: 
Background 
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Concern was expressed by a  group of eminent scientists about genetic 
recombination  because  most  laboratory  work  in  1974  used  E.  coli,  an 
organism found  in  enormous  numbers  in  the  human  alimentary  system. 
Unease was felt because it  was conjectured that, should it prove possible to 
construct an E. coli which had highly pathogenic or carcinogenic properties, 
or released a  hormone or protein in  such quantities that created a  serious 
health  hazard,  then  considerable  damage  could  be  done  to  the  human 
population. It should also be noted that the scientists who expressed concern 
were eminent molecular biologists and were  not experts in  epidemiology, 
medical microbiology or population genetics; and had they consulted experts 
in those fields they would all, without exception, been assured that there was 
no justification for serious concern. However, once public concern has been 
expressed, a voluntary temporary pause was agreed by scientists involved in 
this work whilst government agencies considered the various possibilities and 
until appropriate guidelines had been drawn up. After considerable debate 
and advice from scientists, medical and epidemiological experts the general 
conclusion in I 976 was that, provided suitable precautions were taken, then 
the benefits far outweighed any risks which may be involved. The laboratory 
containment precautions are not novel ones or specially designed for this 
work. They are well  established for the routine handling of pathogens in 
medical and microbiological research. 
So What Are the Risks Involved? 
As  most  work  has been done and con•tinues  to be  done in  E. coli,  the 
comments will be largely restricted to that organism which in certain respects 
can still be regarded as the "ll'orst case" example. It perhaps should also be 
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required to give a 50150 chance of  causing an infection. In other words, one or 
a few organisms are not likely to cause an infection. 
Possible Escape from a Physical Containment Laboratory 
In addition to the generally accepted standards of "good microbiological 
practice" whereby organisms are handled under clean laboratory conditions 
and a  high standard of personal hygiene with restrictions to minimise the 
possibility of  infection of  staff there are, in the UK, four levels of  containment 
laboratory, the lowest  level  is  I  to the  highest containment level  IV.  The 
standards and conditions are carefully laid down with general medical and 
safety surveillance increasing in severity to the highest containment level. 
From many years of experience with pathogenic organisms there is  well 
documented evidence to estimate within reasonable limits the risk of escape 
between the physical containment laboratories. These have been calculated at 
10-
1 between each level. That is, the chances of escape are 1 in  101 bacteria. 
The chances of escape from a category IV laboratory are therefore 1 in  10 12 
bacteria. 
Biological Containment 
It has also been considered much safer to work with disabled or enfeebled 
laboratory strains of  bacteria which, even if they do escape, would not be able 
to survive in  the environment - at least for any long period of time, and 
would be extremely unlikely to colonise the human alimentary system. 
The usual disabled laboratory strain of E.  coli used for this work is called 
K 12. This strain is not usually regarded as pathogenic, and does not usually 
survive in  the  human gut for more than 2 or 3 days.  It cannot normally 
compete with the indigenous gut flora and has not been demonstrated to 
colonise. 
During the past four years much work has been done to construct even 
safer  biologically  disabled organisms  which  require  special  nutrients  not 
normally found in the human gut. There is now, as a result of  this work, a very 
wide range of disabled organisms available suitable for most experimental 
and large-scale studies. 
Three grades of  biological disablement have been recognised which depend 
on the characterisation of the organism - its  use  with a  specified vector 
system-evidence from animal or human tests to indicate its effectiveness as 
a disabled system- any special substrate requirements. 
Once again a risk factor of 10-
1 has been assigned to each levels of  biological 
disablement similar to that assigned to the difference between the physical 
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used  then  there  is  a  concomitant relaxation  of the  physical  containment 
conditions required- not only is this considered safer but investigators are 
encouraged to use  them  by allowing an appropriate decrease in  physical 
containment. 
Risks to Workers 
These can be divided into three main groups. Taking the "worst possible 
case" examples, these are: 
I.  E. coli  containing  a  human  gene  coding  for  a  physiologically  active 
hormone. If, assuming the worst, the normal human gut E. coli population 
were colonised -taken over- by the genetically manipulated organism 
which expressed the gene continually at the maximum possible rate and, 
furthermore, that the hormone was totally absorbed by the gut, it has been 
calculated  that,  even  under  these  unlikely  and  extreme  conditions, 
there would be insufficient hormone produced to have any adverse effect 
on the human. 
2.  E. coli containing a gene coding for a protein which may have antigenic 
properties. Similarly to (I) if a "ll'orst case" example is taken and the gut is 
colonised by the genetically manipulated organism it is considered most 
unlikely that sufficient material could be produced to invoke a significant 
antigenic response.  . 
The reservation might be in this case of some novel, previously unknown 
protein  material  which,  although  unlikely,  may  produce some so  far 
unknown  effect.  However,  until  such  a  case  arises  this  must  remain 
speculative, and any likely damage, conjectural. 
3.  E. coli containing a gene coding for a bacterial toxin. If as previously one 
takes a "ll'orst case" example and calculates the maximum quantity of, 
say, botulinum toxin that could be produced (and this is the most powerful 
toxin known to man) it  is  most unlikely that sufficient toxin would be 
made to cause any adverse effect. 
It should be strongly emphasized once again that these are "ll'orst cases" 
and make enormous assumptions which in  many cases we  know simply do 
not exist (an example would be that of the hormone insulin, which is  only 
slightly absorbed by the gut. It is  largely degraded by enzymes found in the 
gut). 
Risks to the Environment 
1.  Survival of  a Genetically Manipulated Organism in Sewage Systems 
Some work has been done in simulated, laboratory model, conditions, 
and, depending on the nature of the E. coli system used, there may be 
some survival in the sewage system; but for how long and whether it 
remains viable when put on the land or in the sea must remain, for the 
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2.  Deliberate Release of  Genetically Manipulated Organisms for, say, 
Agricultural Purposes 
Although no such work  has been done to my  knowledge, similar 
arguments  would  apply  as  to  those  put  forward  concerning  the 
colonisation of the human gut. 
It  is  well  established  that  to  maintain  a  genetically  manipulated 
organism  requires  carefully  controlled conditions,  nutrients,  anti-
biotics and other factors; otherwise the "foreign or inserted gene" is 
lost by the host organism. Also the implantation of  an additional gene 
usually weakens the ability of the organism to survive in the highly 
competitive environment in which organisms usually exist. 
It  is  therefore difficult  to envisage a  situation,  where a  genetically 
manipulated organism will "take over" from one normally found in 
the  ·environment  and  maintain  its  inserted  gene.  Until  specific 
examples become available it is difficult to sensibly argue a case one 
way or the other, but all the present evidence would indicate that the 
deliberate or accidental release of  a genetically manipulated organism 
into the environment is  unlikely to cause any serious hazard. 
3.  Effects on the "Gene Pool" 
Most genes have been with us for millions of years. Human cells each 
containing all  the known human genes are lost to the environment 
through natural routes in great numbers each day. There is also some 
evidence,  albeit  slender,  that  some  micro-organisms  do  contain 
human gene sequences. There does not therefore appear to be any case 
for concern regarding modification of the natural gene pool by the 
release of  genes into the environment through genetically manipulated 
organisms. 
Industrial Fermentation using Genetically Manipulated Organisms 
Since the weight of evidence has indicated that the guidelines concerning 
laboratory  work  can  be  relaxed,  the attention  of some  critics  of genetic 
recombination  has  focused  on  industrial  applications.  Industrial  fermen-
tation is strictly the"  use" of  the products of  genetic manipulation rather than 
genetic  manipulation  per  se.  In  general  industrial-scale  fermentation  is 
considered much safer than laboratory work because industrial fermenters 
are made of metal and steel pipes are used to supply nutrients etc., compared 
to the glass vessels and rubber tubing used in laboratory scale work which are 
more vulnerable to accidental damage. 
Industrial fermentation has been well established for many years e.g. in the 
production of antibiotics, preparation of enzymes and the brewing industry. 
There is a well recognised,very high safety record in the fermentation industry. PAPI:R  RISKS AND RISKS  ASSESSMENT  33 
In certain cases - such as vaccine production - genetic manipulation 
offers a much safer alternative for their industrial production. The use of the 
pathogenic organism is avoided as the appropriate part of  the pathogen DNA 
is  inserted into E.  coli or some other  "relative~v" safe bacterium and this 
nonpathogenic system is  then used in the production of the vaccine. 
What are the Remaining Risks as seen after Six Years of Widespread Use of 
Recombinant DNA Technology? 
It should be pointed out that recombinant DNA work is a technique and to 
date  there  has  been  no  evidence  from  the  many  hundreds  of centres 
throughout the world that it involves any novel biohazard- that is beyond 
those  wliich  are  already  known  to  exist  with  any  work  involving  a 
microbiological organism. 
Therefore, any risks which may exist are due to a hazard already known to 
be present in the handling of a particular organism i.e. because it is a known 
pathogen. 
In  the large-scale  use of genetically  manipulated organisms the  risk of 
allergic reactions are those which may already exist with the organisms prior 
to its manipulation. 
In  Summary 
Any risks associated with genetic manipulation still remain conjectural and 
all the scientific and medical information and data to date has not provided 
any evidence which  suggests that  there are any risks associated with  this 
technology beyond those which are already  known  to exist  in  work  with 
.  . 
mtcro-orgamsms. 
Risk  assessment  procedures,  such  as  those  used  in  the  UK,  for  the 
categorisation of work involving genetic recombination have proved flexible, 
effective and easily operated by local biological safety committees. 
The considerable scientific evidence to support this conclusion should not 
be  underestimated.  It  has  provided  sufficient  evidence  to  allow  national 
expert  advisory  groups  throughout  the  world  to  recommend  that  the 
conditions required to undertake work involving genetic recombination can 
be radically relaxed. J4  RISKS AND RISKS ASSESSMENT 
Mr Puglisi, 
~apporteur: 
PAPER 
My report is divided into two sections: one deals with the hypothetical risks 
connected with recombinant DNA technology, which are purely a matter for 
conjecture, and the second deals with the precautions which can be taken to 
minimise these risks. 
Generally speaking there are two potential sources of risk: 
a)  the product of an industrial engineering operation and 
b)  the modified organism that produces it. 
The amount of risk associated with a product depends on how industrially 
pure  it  is  and,  in  a  way,  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  risk  inherent  in 
recombinant DNA technology itself, i.e.  in lab scale technology. 
On the other hand the modified organism, i.e. the genetically engineered 
object which has produced the above-mentioned product, may, theoretically 
speaking, be associated with a  series of conditions which produce pheno-
typical, genotypical or environmental effects of  some relevance, and therefore 
involving some risk. 
The first  type of effect arises when the polynucleotide sequences of the 
chromosome structure become activated, split and discharged. This puts the 
plant operators at a certain risk and affects the environment, endangering it to 
an extent which can be calculated according to the reduction in the quantity of 
the polluting ingredient, its possible integration with the microbial flora of  the 
environment,  and  the  safety  regulations  and  measures  in  force  in  the 
production and waste treatment plants. 
In  the  second  effect,  the  regulative  properties  of an  organism  whose 
polynucleotide sequences have been modified through genetic manipulation 
may be altered with the possible consequences that its ecological role may also 
eventually be altered. 
Therefore  .. the level  of risk associated with modified organisms depends, 
once more, on the safety regulations and measures in force in the production 
and waste treatment plants.  My  purpose has  merely been  to describe  the 
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amount of risk  involved;  perhaps  a  discussion  on the  subject  would  be 
appropriate. 
We realise that if someone wished to prepare an organism which contained 
a toxin able to be transmitted to human beings, he certainly would not ask for 
anyone's permission, least of all that of the EEC. Nevertheless, let us believe 
that we live in the best of  all possible worlds with Pangloss for President. and I 
shall make a few remarks concerning possible ways of minimising the risks. 
In order to evaluate a risk of precaution, and therefore the definition of  the 
most effective .precautions, the goals which may be accomplished by the use of 
the precaution must first be evaluated. I should just like to mention three very 
brief points for discussion. 
Firstly, reagent cocktails for recombinant ON A technology should only be 
sold to laboratories and institutes licensed to use them by, for example, the 
European Laboratory of Molecular Biology in Heidelberg. 
Secondly, only products from industrial institutes or laboratories whose 
competence to carry out such  work  has  been officially  recognised  by  the 
European Laboratory of Molecular Biology in Heidelberg should be allowed 
to be put on the market. 
Thirdly,  scientific  magazines  should  only  accept  articles  referring  to 
recombinant  ON A  technology  if  they  include  in  their  "materials  and 
methods" section the precautions which should be taken to minimize risks. 
These are basically criteria for safety bearing in  mind the operator, the 
treatment. waste treatment and the host strains used for genetic engineering. 
The criteria for using a host strain safely are so well known, that they only 
deserve a  passing mention: if they  are temperature-sensitive or dependent 
strains, i.e. unable to survive outside the controlled temperature conditions of 
the plant. fermentation jar, pilot plant or industrial plant. etc., there is  less 
risk. 
If temperature-sensitive or dependent strains, and strains which have been 
rendered chemical-dependent by genetically recombining two types of host 
strain, are used simultaneously, then the strains will have a tenuous hold on 
life. making it  highly improbable that they should misbehave in one of the 
undesirable ways described earlier. 
DISCUSSION 
Mr  Roskam: 
For practical  reasons.  tt  1s  Important  not  to  take  one  single  level  for 
conjectural risk and to apply it  across the board to all  genetic engineering 
work. An effort should be made to identify work not involving risk and not 
requiring special safety measures. In my own experience, much ofthe work is 36  RISKS AND RISKS ASSESSMENT  DISCUSSION 
carried out on defective genes which could not possibly be biologically active. 
The overall rate of progress on genetic engineering work would be slowed 
down considerably  if unnecessarily strict rules were applied. 
Mr  Puglisi, Rapporteur: 
You  have  mentioned genes, whose sequencing makes them  biologically 
inactive. However, there are certain sequences which are not functional from 
a genetic viewpoint, but could still have a vital regulatory effect if they were 
inserted at a particular point in  the DNA sequence of an active organism. 
Mr  Buringh: 
In the Dutch trade union movement, we have up to now always expressed 
strong reservations about the use of recombinant ON  A techniques. Wherever 
doubt persists, extreme care is needed. Some have said "There is no proof  that 
it is dangerous".  For us, the burden of proof should be reversed. The motto 
should be" H I/zen in douht. don't". In the light of that general position, I would 
like to ask three questions. hrstly, there has been frequent use of the words 
"prohah/c".  "improhah/c".  and "high(\' improhahlc".  What can be done to 
remove the remaining element of doubt. Secondly, what are the risks for a 
host system other thanE coli'? Thirdly, what are the risks involved in scaling-
up to industrial production'! 
Mr Stewart: 
Despite claims to the contrary, I would like to emphasize that the subject is 
still controversial. Unlike chemical or radioactive pollution, a new biohazard 
could proliferate and would therefore be an irreversible event. The burden of 
proof must therefore be reversed. We must be sure that there are no risks. 
In the present state of  scientific knowledge, I would also like to go on record 
as saying that we do not have sufficient knowledge to guarantee that there are 
no risks. On many issues there is  relatively little knowledge.  Furthermore, 
some of  the information we have acquired recently indicates that certain risks 
are greater, not smaller, than we thought five years ago. The specific example 
relates to virally-caused cancers. 
Nor can it  be claimed that genetic engineering is  safe simply because no 
accidents have occurred in the six years of its existence. We do not know that 
there  have  been  no  accidents.  In  the  case  of radioactivity  and  chemical 
carcinogens, serious health hazards were only identified many years later. On 
the other hand, if it  is  true that  no accident has yet  occurred, it  may  be 
precisely because strict safety norms have been applied in the laboratory. It is 
no argument for relaxing precautions now, especially as we are now moving to 
large-scale work. 
Mr  Herbig: 
The discussion has focused on the prevention of genetically manipulated 
micro-organisms  escaping  into  the  open  environment.  However,  some 
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fixation in agriculture, will require genetically manipulated organisms which 
are specifically designed to survive in the natural environment. In view of  our 
relatively limited knowledge of ecological relationships of micro-organisms 
under  controlled  laboratory  conditions,  how  can  we  know  what  would 
happen outdoors'? 
Mr Bolt: 
It  is certainly up to us as scientists to try and allay the fears of the general 
public. However, I do not believe we could control the sale of  components of 
reactive  cocktails.  It  should  be  remembered  that  these  enzymes,  the 
components of the reactive cocktail, were discovered in  bacteria and exist 
everywhere in nature. It would be totally impracticable to talk about stopping 
the sale of these things. They could be easily manufactured in the laboratory. 
Mr Bonety: 
Dr Gibson referred to the existence of  evaluation procedures in the United 
Kingdom  which  seemed  to  be  both  flexible  and  effective.  Are  similar 
procedures  followed  in  other Member States?  Are  the  public authorities 
responsible for collecting this information or is it left to the responsibility of 
the scientific community'? 
Mr von der Decken: 
In  Dr Gibson's paper, the chances of escape from a laboratory with the 
highest level of  containment are given at I in  10
1 ~ bacteria. If I understand that 
correctly, it means that I bacterium out of  every 10
1 ~ bacteria handled therein, 
can ultimately get out. This would seem to set a standard which would then be 
progressively reduced under industrial conditions.  A  major incident might 
occur resulting in a massive release. Could Dr Gibson indicate how possible 
events of this kind are built into the probability calculations'? 
It must also be pointed out that every technology, new or old, involves a 
risk. Even the abandonment of  a new technology entails risks. This means our 
discussion is limited to risk evaluation, i.e.: How great is the risk in relation to 
the benefits'? 
Mr Lafontaine: 
I can understand the enthusiasm of many of  those working on recombinant 
DNA  research.  However,  we  must  remain  objective.  Genetic engineering 
should not be overrated. There are many other areas where solutions are at 
least as important, if not more so, in  safeguarding the future of mankind. 
There is  a danger of confusing usefulness with necessity, hope with reality. 
Genetic engineering is certainly a techpique which opens the way to progress 
in research and offers benefits in industry, medicine and pharmaceuticals. But 
we need to compare the results obtained using RON A techniques with those 
of other approaches, tackling the same practical and theoretical problems. 
Similarly, we must compare the conjectural riskS of RONA with the physical, 
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time to ask the advice of specialists in  risk/benefit analysis, such as Rowe in 
the USA. 
Mr Couture: 
Is there an internationally recognised body which sets standards for genetic 
engineering work, like that for radiologtcal protection in the nuclear field'? 
Mr De Grave: 
We have had examples in the past where industry assured us that there were 
no safety problems. Yet accidents occurred, but there was a tendency to play 
them down.  Contrary to  requirements, neither the public nor the  health 
authorities were informed. What steps have been taken to ensure that there 
arc no cover-ups, even of a  minor nature, in genetic engineering'? 
Mr Sapir: 
The concept of risk has been looked at from various aspects. Yet there has 
been no mention of"social risk". Quite apart from the type of  risk associated 
with pathogenicity and biohazards, the launching of new types of products on 
the market could have very significant effects. Secondly, while there was a 
certain amount of  public debate in the United States and other countries at the 
initial stages, the whole area has more recently become shrouded in a veil of 
industrial secrecy. Is discussion still possible'? 
Mr Owen: 
There are two steps in relation to risk. These are the same for carcinogeni-
city and radiation. The first step involves "risk assessment" in which a band of 
probability or a range of  options is identified. The second is··  risk acceptance" 
where the decision on what to do about it, is  taken. Unfortunately, the risk 
assessment work is  often carried out by groups of experts from government 
and possibly industry, without any wider involvement. A series of options is 
then presented for risk acceptance by a  broader group, often giving rise to 
arguments about whether the right assessments have  been  made.  We can 
avoid this problem in the recombinant DNA field by ensuring that all interests 
are involved in  the discussions from the beginning. Many workers' organi-
sations now have scientists of high calibre who can in fact validate or evaluate 
the probability assessments that have been made. 
Mr Busi: 
The answers to the question of risk seem to be based more on what is not 
known,  than  what  is  known.  In  practice,  we  only  know  that  the  risk  is 
extremely small. But no figures have been given as, for example, in the case of 
radiation. What proportion of total research expenditure on genetic engi-
neering is devoted to the study of risks? I suspect it is extremely small. There is 
a strong case for creating an international commission whose task would be to 
inform the public of the real  risks associated with the development of the 
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Mr Zoli: 
I would like to ask Mr Puglisi what are the possibilities of "a looney ll'ith a 
hathtuh" carrying out the type of clandestine activity which he mentioned in 
his paper'! 
The Chairman,  Mrs  Heuser: 
Is it not possible to envisage a system for safety research to go hand-in-hand 
with research on the development of the technology itself? 
M  r G  ihson,  Rapporteur: 
To reply to the large number of questions, I would point out firstly that 
man has been involved in genetic manipulation for a considerable length of 
time.  h.H  example,  he  has  been  domesticating  animals  and  harnessing 
bacteria for fermentation. In the fermentation industry, strain improvement 
through standard genetic techniques is  well established. 
Secondly, as Professor Dunican pointed out, considerable information is 
now available on the genetic structure of micro-organisms, far more so than 
on the various higher animal forms. In the wake of  the so-called recombinant 
DNA debate, a lot of work has been done in trying to obtain the basic data in 
relation to "risk assessment".  We now have considerably more information 
on which to base our advice. 
Thirdly, it  must be pointed out that risk assessment ·work has not been 
relaxed.  It  is  continuing in  the United Kingdom and in  the United States. 
Areas for experiments have been identified.  Funds are available and high 
priority is given to such work. However, the experiments are laborious and 
there is  a  feeling among scientists that so much is  now known about these 
micro-organisms, that little more can be achieved in terms of  risk assessment. 
In  the  United  Kingdom,  the  Genetic  Manipulations  Advisory  Group 
(GMAG) has a  flexible system for the categorisation of experiments which 
has  much to recommend  it.  It takes account of all  factors  including the 
information already available and local ability to carry out the work. 
There were questions about the gathering of  information in relation to risk 
assessment. In the United Kingdom, the GMAG does try to make available as 
much of this information as possible. It is  usually published in the form of 
notes.  At the international level, the European Science Foundation (ESF) 
distributes information which it  receives from the various national bodies. 
With regard to what happens in the case of  accidents, I cannot comment for 
the rest of Europe. But within the United Kingdom, all such accidents have to 
be reported under the Health & Safety at Work Act. There are inspectors to 
ensure safe conditions and that all  information in  relation  to accidents is 
noted and made·available. 
I  do not  think  the  patent system  impedes  public information.  In  fact, 
because these are lodged in  the Patent Office, they are freely available for 
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With regard to worker participation, there has always been consultation 
with the Trade Union Congress in the United Kingdom. The latter nominates 
representatives on GMAG. And the newly-constituted Advisory Committee 
on  Dangerous Pathogens (ACDP) in  the  United  Kingdom also has trade 
union representatives. 
M r Sgaramella: 
The conjectural risks associated with RONA work have been the subject of 
specific experiments undertaken by the scientific community in  response to 
pressure from public opinion. The risks have been evaluated and, taken as a 
whole, are considered to be acceptable. The Committee on Genetic Experi-
mentation  of the  International  Council  of Scientific  Unions (ICSU)  has 
commissioned a detailed study of all available data in relation to risks. It has 
published a  report  in  accessible language.  I  was one of its co-signatories. 
When talking of  the continued existence of risk, it is important to first get hold 
of the material which already exists. 
Mr Massue: 
How many patents have so far been granted for genetic engineering work 
worldwide'?  · 
Mr Puglisi, Rapporteur: 
I certainly don't want to engage in terrorism in a world which already has 
enough of it.  At the same time, I don't believe we  live in a utopian world in 
which botulinial beer was not made. 
It must be remembered that industrial processes are vastly more complex 
than laboratory-type work. It is also questionable whether the bacteria used in 
a chemical or pharmaceutical industrial process would be the same disabled 
strains on which our current risk assessments have been calculated. 
Then, there is  Mr Zoli's question. While it  is  theoretically possible for an 
individual or a group to do such work on a  home-made basis, the research 
scale and the investment risk required would be so great that these could only 
be  met  either  by  a  great  personal  commitment or by  a  major industrial 
u nderta  king. 
The Chairman, Mrs Heuser: 
If it is not possible to do such work at home, then why is it necessary to limit 
certain material to authorized researchers? 
M r Puglisi, Rapporteur: 
Restriction enzymes and reactive cocktails are normally sold to those who 
have the money to pay for them and thus only go to industry or research 
institutes. I only wanted to point out that the other possibility existed. If there 
was a "looney ll'ith a hmhtuh", he would likely to be so eccentric anyway that 
his behaviour would become conspicuous long before he got round to genetic 
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Mr Sgamarella: 
In relation to industrial scale-up, it  is  important to remember that pilot-
plants or production plants would be using bacteria designed to produce a 
specific product. The worst that could happen would be an escape of  a certain 
volume of culture liquid into the environment. But since these bacteria have 
not undergone natural selection and have been altered to produce a product 
which is  alien to their physiology, they would stand little chance of survival 
out-of-doors. 
Mr Thorley: 
Over the last 20 years sophisticated methods of evaluating risk have been 
developed in  the chemical and nuclear industries. The same techniques could 
be used for the assessment of risk in connection with recombinant ON A. 
The disabled strains which are currently used in laboratories for this type of 
work arc,  indeed, those which  would  be  used  by industry for  large-scale 
industrial work. 
M  r Lafontaine: 
I am certainly not against the use of the recombinant DNA techniques 
where  their  benefits  for  mankind  are  clearcut  and  when  the  appropriate 
protection measures are taken to avoid unacceptable risks for man and the 
environment.  At  the same time,  I  can  understand that  there is  a  mistrust 
among the public on the scientific, technical and industrial applications.  I 
would  like  to  propose an  approach  to the  problem similar to that taken 
towards  ionizing  radiation  and  its  applications.  In  the  latter  instance, 
measures have been drawn up setting out rules and basic standards. When 
Euratom was created in  1958, a group of experts (the"  Group of  Wise Men") 
was set  up to propose Directives for the safe use of radiation and nuclear 
energy. Would it  not be reasonable to adopt a similar approach here? The 
European Communities could in the same way prepare safety standards for 
use of recombinant ON  A. 
Mr Gilby: 
On  behalf  of  the  European  Federation  of  Pharmaceutical  Industry 
Associations ( EFPI A), I would like to make several comments. It  has been 
said of the pharmaceutical industry that we have a lot of products in search of 
a disease. Here, we seem to have an enormous number of  safety regulations in 
search of a hazard. 
The usc of genetically engineered micro-organisms involves problems no 
different  from  those already associated  with  the large-scale production of 
antibiotics and which are weH  understood within the industry. Existing plant 
processes based on micro-organisms have been specifically designed with full 
regard for safety. There are well established quality-control procedures for 
raw  materials,  intermediates  and  finished  products.  The  plant  is  self-
contained and regularly monitored to ensure that there is  no danger to the 
outside environment, and no contamination of the process from it. 42  RISKS AND RISKS ASSESSMENT  DISCUSSION 
There  are  extstmg  processes  which  use  pathogenic  organisms  for  the 
production of vaccines. The introduction of genetic engineering techniques 
will present fewer handling risks than at present. For example, the handling of 
micro-organisms manipulated to produce the protective antigen for foot-and-
mouth virus is much ess hazardous than handling the virus itself as at present. 
Concern  has  been  expressed  about  genetically  manipulated  organisms 
undergoing some spontaneous change which might lead to contamination of 
the product or the evolution of  a high-risk organism. Research has shown that 
it  is  extremely  difficult  to  convert  harmless  organisms  into  pathogens. 
Furthermore, present knowledge shows that the chance of this happening 
spontaneously are extremely remote. 
Mr Buringh: 
Up to now, all risk assessment work seems to have been based on E.  coli. 
Has there been any risk assessment on other systems, i.e. B. subtilis and yeast, 
especially their long-term effects? 
Mr  Herbig: 
There are applications in agriculture and evvironmental protection which 
involve the development of  gene-spliced micro-organisms capable of  surviving 
in the natural environment. Who will decide on the release of  such organisms? 
The implications for society would seem to far outreach the responsibility of 
any individual government or industrial undertaking. 
Mr Puglisi, Rapporteur: 
With regard, Mr Buringh, to B. subtilis and yeast host systems, I don't think 
there is much to add to the risk assessments based on E. coli. The same steps in 
the approach could be repeated, mutatis mutandis. 
One should also ask what form accompanying research on risk assessment 
should  take.  This can  really  only  be  done  by  an  in-depth  study  of the 
mechanisms which control the chromosomal sequence. It cannot be done in 
applied industrial R & D. It must be undertaken in a purely scientific context. 
On the results obtained, it would then be possible to say whether the genetic 
engineering technique in  question could be used in industry. 
I 
Mr Gibson, Rapporteur: 
I did mention the use of host systems other than£. coli, both in my paper 
and in subsequent discussion. However, the talk highlighted the "ll'orst-case" 
scenario which involves E. coli. Very large numbers exist in the human gut. If 
such an organism was to become dangerous and pathogenic, then this would 
be the worst case imaginable. However, there have been experiments with 
other organisms such as B.  subtilis and yeast.  Results to date indicate that 
these would be considerably less risky than work with E. coli. 
The other part of Mr Buringh's question was on possible long-term effects 
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involved  in  both laboratory and  industrial  work  must  be  notified  to  the 
GMAG and the Health &  Safety Executive.  Indeed, a long-term epidemio-
logical  programme is  already envisaged.  Nobody sensible would say that, 
because nothing has happened in six years. nothing will happen in the future. 
There is a general awareness that, if there are any long-term problems, they 
have yet to manifest themselves. For this reason, epidemiological monitoring 
will  be  undertaken. If there are any problems, these will certainly show up. 
provided the notification procedure is  followed. 
Mr Herbig's question on the release of genetically-manipulated organisms 
into the environment is a difficult one. I have no ready answer. The long-term 
environmental problems would have to be looked at closely. For instance, in 
the United Kingdom. the deliberate release of  a gene-spliced organism for use 
in  agriculture would have to be examined very carefully by the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food before any such release could ever take place. 
To summarize, one should firstly not underestimate the amount of work 
which  has  been  done to  try  and  produce answers to  the  question of risk 
assessment.  There  is  now  considerable  published  scientific  evidence.  The 
work has been fully supported by the various national bodies. The NIH have 
implemented  an  extensive  research  programme.  The  results  of its  risk 
assessment experiments have been published and are widely available. 
Secondly, with regard to industrial application.s, one should not overlook 
the  amount of R  &  D  which  has  to  be  done before  the  techniques  reach 
industrial scale. Careful experiments have to be done on the stability of the 
organism  and  its  pathogenicity.  The  pharmaceutical  and  fermentation 
industries have a well-established safety record in this field. In most European 
countries, there is  legislation governing health and safety at work.  Further-
more. any new product must be carefully reviewed by the different ministries 
concerned and bodies such as the Committee on Safety of Medicines in  the 
United Kingdom, before it  can be launched on the market. PAPER  SAFETY MEASURES 
TOPIC C:  SAFETY MEASURES 
Mr Bruce, 
Rapporteur: 
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The development  and  possibilities,  together  with  the  risks  incurred  in 
genetic engineering, have been 'reviewed in the earlier sections of  this colloquy. 
The risk assessment associated with the work has a direct bearing on the safety 
measures  required  to  ensure  a  minimal  opportunity  for  any  escape  of 
dangerous material. 
Thus the use of a crippled host such as certain strains of  E. coli K 12, which 
are incapable of surviving outside of the artificial environment created for 
them within the laboratory, appears to afford absolute protection. Unfor-
tunately nothing in biology should be accepted as being absolute. The strains 
of£. coli K 12 have been studied for over 50 years and more is probably known 
about them than of any other organism. 
The 0 N A  material inserted into E.  coli  K 12  host cells  is  usually incor-
porated into non-mobilisable plasmids as the cloning vector. Should E.  coli 
K 12  organisms, carrying ON  A  material in  such a  non-mobilisable vector, 
gain access to the human gut it will not be capable of  reproducing but there are 
remote  possibilities  of  mobilisation  and  transfer  of  the  normally  non-
mobilisable plasmid vector, by conjugation, to wild strains of E.  coli resident 
in the bowel of humans. 
The probability of this occurring is very low and can be estimated at I  o-ln 
per surviving bacterium per day in the gut. Survival in the gut by E.  coli K 12 is 
limited on average to 3 days. 
Some workers  believe  that  there  is  a  possibility of transfer of genetic 
material within the flora of the digestive tract to other indigenous bacterial 
species by methods not reproducible in  laboratory experiments. 
The probability of any of these conditions is  extremely unlikely. So what 
safety measures can and should be applied to further reduce any chance of a 
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It must be borne in mind that safety measures tend to be restrictive on the 
operator, making his work more laborious and time consuming. The cost of 
an experiment  will  also escalate  progressively as the safety  measures are 
increased. 
It has been implied that the scale-up to industrial production would involve 
much higher levels of risk. From personal experience, I can give one example 
where this would not be the case. In  my own institute, I am responsible not 
only for virus containment, mainly foot-and-mouth virus, but also for the 
only commercial unit in Britain producing foot-and-mouth virus vaccines. In 
it, we have at any one time thousands of  lit res of  active foot-and-mouth virus 
culture in  tank systems. I regard this as one of the safest aspects of our work. 
The  changeover  to  a  genetically-manipulated  vaccine  production  system 
would, in  my mind, introduce even greater safety. 
Take the worst possible accident where an explosion breaks open vessels 
and  blows  out  windows,  with  the  loss  of negative  air  pressure.  A  high-
concentration aerosol cloud would emanate which would only require the 
right  weather  conditions  to  create  a  serious  foot-and-mouth  outbreak, 
possibly involving several strains. 
The aim of genetic engineering work is to remove a small part of the virus 
genome. This can already be done and purified on a  very small scale. This 
section of the genome would then code for the antigenic abilities associated 
with  the  outer surface of the  virus  particle.  It  could  then  be  inserted  in 
plasmids and  produced  in  culture  from  there  on.  No  matter  what  then 
happened to the culture, a  foot-and-mouth outbreak could not occur. The 
particles  used  in  the  vaccine  would  be  non-infectious  to  the  animals 
susceptible to foot-and-mouth. The same safety considerations would apply 
in the case of vaccines against human pathogens. 
Within the microbiological disciplines dealing with pathogenic organisms 
of man and animals, over many years the concepts of good microbiological 
practice  have  developed.  The  last  twenty  years  especially  has  seen  great 
advances in the principles and 'practice of laboratory safety. 
Good  microbiological  practice  has  enabled  scientists  to  manipulate 
pathogens safely. In the field of genetic manipulation many of the scientists 
have not experienced in their earlier training the need to use safe laboratory 
techniques  as  have  scientists  in  pathology  and  bacteriology.  With  the 
increased awareness of  the possible dangers, most have acquired the necessary 
knowledge and experience.  It  is  most important that training in  microbio-
logical safety proceeds steadily with new staff. Advanced training is required 
for experienced staff in  order to cope effectively with the increased levels of 
containment and the more sophisticated equipment required at the higher 
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The operational control of safety in  a  genetic manipulation laboratory 
should be under the control of  a Microbiological Safety Officer. He should be 
experienced in  good microbiological practice and in  the operation, main-
tenance  and  testing of the safety equipment  required.  Too  often,  micro-
biological safety cabinets and other equipment are put into the laboratory and 
are  accepted  as  giving  a  high  level  of safety  without  any in  situ  testing. 
Cabinets need to be installed in the correct location and the seals checked on 
installation, and regularly thereafter. If the equipment is properly used, it can 
provide a  high level of safety. 
A  Safety  Committee  should  be  established  to  assist  him.  An  active, 
knowledgeable committee which is  fully  informed of the projected experi-
mental  work  can  plan  and control  the  safety  protocols  of a  laboratory 
conducting work at the Category I and II  levels of risk. Some countries (UK 
and USA) have now delegated control from the Central Authority to these 
committees, only requiring notification oft  he experiments at these levels. The 
higher levels  of risk  assigned  to Category  Ill  and  IV  require  much  more 
detailed consideration of  assessment of their category and of  the containment 
facility.  At these higher levels  it  is  most important that there exist efficient 
testing systems to establish the integrity of  equipment such as microbiological 
safety cabinets, autoclaves and laboratory ventilation systems. Monitoring of 
the important physical parameters and the raising of alarms, in the event of 
failure, is  necessary. Plans must be evolved to cope with emergencies which 
may occur in  the event of equipment failure or of accidents. 
Because  of the  complexity  of the  measures  and  the  higher  standards 
required it  is sensible that an experienced national staff should oversee such 
work conducted at Category III and Category IV levels. 
DISCUSSION 
M  r Balducci: 
As a virologist. I basically agree with what Mr Bruce has said. In 25 years 
personal experience in  diagnostic work on virus diseases, I  have cultivated 
nearly every human virus, both pathogenic and non-pathogenic. In that time 
we  have never picked up an infection from the matenal on whtch we were 
working.  Physical containment offers sufficient  protection.  We have also 
found that strains grown in tissue culture are significantly weaker than those 
which we normally find on a bus or in the theatre, and occasionally pick up. 
However. in undertaking work on a  new strain, we have sometimes noticed 
that the specific antibodies appear in our blood. This could mean that it  is 
possible in some cases that laboratory workers are affected by the material 
with which they are working. It is a very rare event. Nevertheless we cannot 
exclude the possibility that an infection could develop and that this infection 
could be transmitted from one person to another. This militates strongly in 
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While  I  am  convinced  that  the  physical  containment  and  biological 
containment  procedures  we  have  devised  are  sufficient  to  reduce  risk  to 
almost zero,  I  would favour the creation of a  third  level  of containment, 
namely: immunological containment. It would leave public opinion with an 
easier  mind.  There  should  also  be  an  integrated  world-wide  system  of 
surveillance, as already exists in the case of  influenza. In nearly all of  the larger 
countries  there  are  specialized  laboratories  capable  of  identifying  any 
epidemiological risk. The information would be forwarded to bodies such as 
the  WHO or the  World /nfluen::.a  Centre( 
1
)  in  London. The information 
would make it  possible to develop appropriate vaccines in time. These would 
be of universal benefit. 
Mr Stewart: 
I would like to reiterate what was said by Mr Owen this morning on the 
importance of including  representatives of the  different  social  groups  in 
discussions on safety measures. We could all benefit from the experience of 
the GMAG Committee in the United Kingdom, which is one of the relatively 
few controlling committees which includes representatives from trade unions 
and other groups.  It  is  no coincidence that adequate records are  kept  in 
Britain,  to  allow  for  long-term  epidemiological  analysis.  There  are  few 
countries where this is  done so systematically. It is  not done in  France. The 
GMAG model could be usefully extended to other countries. 
It is  also important to remember that, ultimately, pollution  knows no 
frontiers. If there ever was an accident, it would be an international event. 
Safety measures will only make sense, therefore, if they are homogeneous from 
one country to another. Different safety standards would furthermore create 
distorsions  of competition  in  favour  of countries  with  more  lax  safety 
regulations. The competitive pressures  in  genetic engineering are intense. 
Time is  critical.  Work would quickly move away·  from countries following 
more prudent safety regulations.  I hope we can reach sufficient agreement 
here to make some proposals for a homogeneous mechanism of control. 
The Chairman, Mrs  Heuser: 
I must stress once again that it  is  not the task of this meeting to arrive at 
common decisions. Nevertheless, your question is of particular importance. I 
would  perhaps  ask  the  Rapporteur  to  give  us  some  information  on 
comparative safety measures in  the different Member States and the United 
States. 
Mr  Bonety: 
At the outset, I  would like to say how much I appreciated Mr Bruce's 
report. It is worth recalling that the Economic and Social Committee did not 
( 
1
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wait  to  hold  a  Colloquy  before  coming  out  in  favour  of a  European 
Community Directive in this field.  I endorse Mr Bruce's suggestions on the 
appointment of  a safety officer. Some shrugged their shoulders at the idea of  a 
public official doing this job.  But  if the official  is  properly trained in  the 
laboratory and in industry, I do not see that it matters whether he is an official 
or not. In the coalmining industry, one of the first trade union demands was 
for workers to have their own safety officers. This could not prevent some of 
the major accidents. But it recognised the right of miners to have a say in their 
own safety. In view of the international character of the problem, does the 
Rapporteur agree that there should be uniform safety standards at least at 
European level? 
Some years ago the Economic and Social Committee unanimously called 
for a Community nuclear safety code. It has not yet been accepted by all the 
Members States. Is there a danger of divergent safety standards emerging in 
the  DNA field?  Could the scientific community not put sufficient  moral 
pressure on national governments and European Commission to look beyond 
national  frontiers and to adopt identical guidelines valid for all  Member 
States. 
M r von der Decken: 
Mr Bruce  has, to  my  mind, quite correctly stressed the need for good 
microbiological practice, the training of new staff  and further training. But in 
a sector which is  undergoing such rapid expansion is  it  possible to maintain 
standards at this high level?  · 
The United Kingdom is currently working at a high level, and at standards 
which all other countries should ultimately aim at.  However, although the 
technical possibilities for such protection already exist, I wonder whether the 
system would operate effectively throughout Europe. 
Mr Herbig: 
Since  we  are  fortunate  to  have  the chairmen  of the  different  national 
committees present, I would like to ask them: how many projects are currently 
running in each country. 
Secondly,  is  there  not  a  danger of a  fall  in  the  level  of good  medical 
microbiological  practice? Standards might fall  because safety regulations 
were being relaxed and also because of the sudden recruitment of a  large 
number of research workers who had no special training in this area. 
Mr van Campen: 
Listening to some of the earlier questions in this morning's debate I had the 
impression that no attention was being paid to safety. Mr Bruce's paper and 
the more recent discussion indicate that much has been done in this field in 
recent years. I am not so worried about future safety in this field.  But it is 
desirable that we should bring national measures into line within a somewhat 
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In hospitals in the Netherlands we have a system for the recording of'fa/.\c 
or ncar accident.\".  Would there be a case for recording similar incidents in 
R DNA laboratories. Information would then he exchanged from which other 
laboratories could usefully learn. 
Mr  Fiers: 
In  1976. the European Science hHJndation set up a  liaison committee to 
co(\rdinate safety measures in  Europe. The  British GMAC.i  system looked 
particularly impressive at that time and it  was suggested that this should be 
taken as the model. This turned out to he difficult in practice. The ()MAG 
approach was based on a case-by-case system which operated wdl in Britain 
but which could not easily be applied to other countries. There was then a shift 
in  thinking. at  least  in  several  Luropcan countries,  towards following  the 
American guidelines of the National Institutes of Health (NIH). These are 
very comprehensive and specify  in  great  detail  the  type of biological and 
physical containment which should be followed for each experiment. The 
question  was  asked:  how  much  difference  is  there  bet ween  the guiddines 
followed by the different European countries. Here again the question vvas 
examined by the LSF Liaison Committee which watched how the guidelines 
were evolving over the  years.  Considerable research  was also done  by a 
committee  of  the  Luropcan  Molecular  Biology  Organization  ( LM BO). 
Detailed comparison of  the guidelines in the principal European countries arc 
set out in its annual reports. This comparati\ e work became progressively less 
important since there was an overall tendency of convergence towards the 
NIH modeL which some countries followed faithfully. 
In  the field  of risk assessment. I  feel  there is  a  confusion. conscious or 
unconscious.  between  fundamental  R  &  0  and applied  work  relating to 
industrial scale-up.  R DN ;\ techniques  have become so  widespread  in  the 
laboratory that  it  is  now practically impossible. to do any basic biological 
research without them. The fact that these techniques are now applied on a 
large  scale  is  no  reason  for  assuming  that  researchers  arc  particularly 
inexperienced.  Most  laboratory  workers  know what  they arc doing.  Ulti-
mately they are responsible for their own work. Although most of  this activity 
now falls  outside the "guidelines".  it  is  undertaken  within  them  wherever 
necessary.  Imposing  limitations  on  this  type  of  research  would  have 
repercussions not only on the health and well-being of mankind. It would also 
impede the pursuit of new knowledge, which is the primary aim of scientific 
research. 
Industrial scale-up is an entirely different question. Here, it is being handled 
by people who no longer have a full grasp oft  he basic aspects oft  he system. 
But, on the other hand, they are now. by definition, working with organisms 
whose make-up is  fully known. Accordingly. it is possible to make a genuine 
risk  assessment  of  the  ability  of  the  organism  to  survive  in  different 
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Fundamental  research  works  with  unknowns.  Industrial  applications 
relate to known organisms. 
Mr  Roskam: 
Mr  Bruce  describes  elaborate  safety  measures  for  the  handling  of 
infectious viruses. Should these norms be applied to all genetic engineering 
experiments? 
Mr Bruce,  Rapporteur: 
I did nol wish  to give the impression that I wanted the highest standards 
applied  to all  experiments.  This  must  largely  be  associated with  the  risk 
assessment. If the risk is considered extremely low, then we are coming into an 
area where good microbiological practice alone should be sufficient. As  the 
risk  becomes  greater,  the  standards  of containment  must  be  raised  ac-
cordingly.  In  the example of foot-and-mouth vaccines, if we  could get  the 
ON A copy of tile  RNA virus segment which is  associated with the antigen 
production  free  from all infectivity or pathogenicity, then we  would have a 
means for vaccine production which could be carried out virtually anywhere 
in  the world. 
Mr Sgaramella 
Many  reasonable  suggestions  have  been  made  covering  issues  such  as 
immunological monitoring, public involvement and the European harmo-
nisation of safety measures. At the same time, we must not forget that these 
issues have been discussed in great depth in the United States with wide-scale 
public involvement. The local community discussed the construction of the 
Harvard laboratory for months. Similar discussions took place in San Diego, 
California, and Ann Arbor, Michigan. In discussing the European situation, 
we should take advantage of the American experience. Their conclusions are 
set out in  the NIH Guidelines. These rules have just been scaled-down as a 
reasoned and appropriate response to assessments which show the risk to be 
less significant. When we  talk of harmonizing European rules, these should 
correspond to those currently followed in  the United States, not to mention 
other countries such as Japan or the Soviet  Union.  If,  in  1981, we  were  to 
adopt a set of rules which  was  valid in  1975,  we  would find  ourselves in  a 
disadvantageous and ridiculous position. 
Mr  Dunican: 
In  1976. the European Science Foundation set up a Liaison Committee to 
see if they could harmonize the different national regulations. It comprised 
the heads of the various national committees. Its membership was much wider 
than  the  EEC,  involving  some  19  countries,  with  the  United  States  and 
Canada as observers. 
The Liaison Committee acted as a centre for  the collection, comparison 
and dissemination of information on what the various countries were doing. 
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recognised  that  basically  similar guidelines  had  been  introduced  in  most 
countries, although some countries were still  evolving towards a  position 
already reached by others. It went on to point out that there was unanimous 
agreement that recombinant DNA work per se ,entailed no significant novel 
biohazards. It reaffirmed its opinion that there was no need for new legislation 
for DNA. 
Finally,  as  a  mark  of confidence  in  the  lack  of risk  associated  with 
recombinant  DNA work, the  ESF Committee disbanded  itself.  However, 
contact has been maintained between the chairmen in the various countries so 
as  to  exchange  information.  It  would  be  useful  to  have  this  statement 
circulated to the meeting. 
The Chairman, Mrs Heuser: 
We have now come to an area which is of  great importance to us within the 
Economic and Social Committee.  Whatever model of safety guidelines is 
followed, how binding should such a system be? It would be useful to have 
further views on this. Specifically, I would like to put the question to Dr 
Gartland: How satisfactorily has United States' experience been with scale-
down and decentralisation? 
Mr Gartland: 
When the National Institutes of Health issued the first Guidelines in 1976, 
we specified four levels of physical containment and three levels of biological 
containment.  We had a  categorization of different classes of experiments 
which fell  into different  levels  of combinations of physical and biological 
containment.  At the  beginning,  we  had a  rather elaborate system for the 
registration  and  review  of experiments.  We  had  a  requirement  for  the 
establishment of institutional biosafety committees. All recombinant ON  A 
work, including work that is  now exempted from the Guidelines, had to be 
reviewed  by  these  biosafety  committees.  In  addition,  the  registration 
documents had to be centrally filed  with the National Institutes of Health 
where they underwent a second-level review. 
Since 1976, a number of things have happened. Based on risk assessment, 
there was a  feeling that the original Guidelines were too stringent in  their 
containment levels. There was a consensus that the procedures involving the 
dual-level review, locally and at the NIH, were too cumbersome. It was felt 
that we needed more flexibility in order to be able to respond to new scientific 
information.  Accordingly,  in  1978  there  was  a  major  revision  of  the 
Guidelines. These lowered containment levels  made the procedures more 
flexible. In I  978, we essentially delegated the registration of  all work on E. coli 
systems to the local committees. These registration documents are therefore 
no longer sent to the NIH. 
In 1980, we took the position that all experiments, for which containment 
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registered with the NIH because the containment levels were pretty straight-
forward. The local committees, as far as we could determine, were doing a 
very good job in  interpreting the Guidelines. We have not had too many 
problems with the system and consequently I think the experience has been 
very good. 
Mrs Lund: 
In Denmark, we have had a problem in evaluating safety levels for the use 
of gene-spliced organisms as a means of production or as a tool for research 
not connected with recombinant ON A. How would Mr Bruce set safety levels 
in such instances'! 
Mr  Buringh: 
I missed reference in Mr Bruce's paper to the drawing up of  safety measures 
required  for  industrial  ap(llications.  There  is  an enormous  difference  in 
approach  between  production  workers  in  a  large-scale  undertaking  and 
researchers in a laboratory. 
I believe it  is  very necessary to adopt a  European Directive, especially in 
view  of the  possible  transnational  implications of risks  and  the  possible 
distorsions in competition. Why has the draft Community Directive been put 
in cold storage'! 
Mr Sapir: 
Genetic  engineering  is  being  undertaken  by  an  ever  larger  number of 
groups. In contrast to laboratories which have long standing experience and 
high safety standards, work is  now being carried out by those who have no 
particular qualifications in  the recombinant DNA field. There are examples 
of this in  Belgium involving subsidiaries of multinational companies in  the 
agri-food sector. There are no rules or committees monitoring this work. 
Experience over the last  150 years shows that binding regulations are the 
only  way  to  ensure  that  safety  standards  are  applied  in  a  competitive 
industrial environment. It is the only way to ensure that the safety standards 
will  be respected across the whole range of industrial sectors involved. 
Mr Stewart: 
In contrast to the United States, our experience in  France with voluntary 
regulations and decentralized control has been rather negative. We have had a 
number of specific instances where the classification of experiments has not 
been properly respected. Norms about movements in and out of recombinant 
ON A laboratories have not been adhered to. It is not sufficient to have a local 
safety committee, if this committee has no point of reference and no recourse 
in instance's where its recommendations are ignored. We would all no doubt 
prefer a  voluntary and decentralized system  which  would  be  much  more 
flexible. Unfortunately, our experience in  France has shown that it does not 
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Mr  Fiers: 
My experience  in  Belgium  with  voluntary controls has  not  been  at  all 
negative.  In  reply  to  a  circular,  only  one  industrial  group  indicated  its 
intention to do genetic engineering work.  Its  experiments are accordingly 
registered. While I cannot be certain, I do not believe that other work is being 
done under cover. Genetic engineering is  not something one can set  up at 
home in the back kitchen. Scientific staff need to be trained and are therefore 
likely to be known by their colleagues. 
Mr  Van  Hoeck: 
Several  speakers,  including  Mr  Buringh,  have  put  questions  to  the 
Commission concerning activity within the European Community. Taking 
the word"  rules" in a very broad sense, the positions in the different Member 
States are not identical, but nevertheless result in a broadly comparable level 
of safety in the work being done. 
In  1978, the Commission put forward a draft Directive which contained a 
single  definition  for  work  and  materials  relating  to  recombinant  ON A 
techniques.  It  provided  for  compulsory  registration  both  for  public  and 
private bodies and proposed that prior authorisation should be obtained from 
the national authorities before undertaking the work. 
But  the  state  of  scientific  knowledge  has  evolved  since  1978.  The 
Commission took part in  the work of the  L::SF  Liaison Committee which 
reviewed  the situation  in  the different  European countries as  well  as the 
United States and Canada. The conclusions, which were summarized by Prof. 
Dunican,  have  been  circulated  to  you.  These  indicate  that,  for  practical 
purposes,  a  sufficient  degree  of  harmonisation  exists  and  that  this  is 
satisfactory from a safety viewpoint. 
This led us to alter the original draft Directive, which had not really been 
discussed  by the Council of Ministers nor formally adopted, into a  draft 
Recommendation. A Directive has the force oflaw and is binding on Member 
States who then have to adapt their legislation to the Community Directive. A 
Recommendation,  on  the  other  hand,  simply  sets  out  guidelines  for  the 
Member  States  and  asks  them  to  take  these  into  account.  This  draft 
Recommendation still requests the adoption of a single definition for ON A 
work. It suggests that the Member States should make notification of  all work 
obligatory,  and  that  all  requests  for  a  notification  and  other documents 
should  be  kept for  a  sufficiently  long period so that, in  the event of an 
accident,  the  origin  could  be  traced.  The  draft  Recommendation  was 
forwarded  to  the  Council  in  1980  and  has  not  yet  been  adopted  by  the 
Council. 
The Commission also drew up an  R  &  D  programme on biomolecular 
engineering in  1980.  One of the  research  projects deals  with  methods for 
detecting possible contamination which could occur in industrial production. 
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Mr Zoli: 
I do not share the views of  those who favour voluntary controls. The issue is 
of such importance that it  should not  be  left  in  the hands of the private 
industry. I would therefore like to ask the European Commission to push 
ahead with the adoption of a directive so as to provide better safeguards for 
society. 
The Chairman. Mrs Heuser: 
Before closing the discussion, I would like to ask the national represen-
tatives  if they  could  provide  an  estimate  of the  number of experiments 
currently being undertaken in each country. The figure for Germany has been 
estimated at  I ,000 projects. 
Mr Gibson: 
In the United Kingdom we now have something like 80 centres involved in 
genetic manipulation work. The number of ongoing individual projects is 
very difficult to estimate. As a guesstimate, there must be around 200 projects 
going on at any one time. 
Mr Winkler: 
In the Netherlands, there are about 150 projects running at the moment. 
These are mostly at the P 1 level, with about 10 % at the P2  level. 
Mrs Lund: 
In  Denmark, there are something like 50 units working on recombinant 
ON A, but each unit may have several projects. 
Mr Rougeon: 
In  France, the registration committee has examined about 280 projects 
since the beginning.  Multiplying this  by  a  factor of 2  to take account of 
multiple projects, and dividing by 2 to allow for projects which have been 
completed, this would give a figure of about 200 projects running. 
Mr Sgaramella: 
For Italy, it is not easy to give a figure since there is no official registration. 
However, there are some 20 to 30 laboratories active in the recombinant DNA 
field. Multiplying this by a factor of  3 to 5, would give an order-of-magnitude 
estimate of between 100 and 200 projects. 
Most of these are at the PI level. Only a few are at the P2 or P3 level. 
Mr Bruce. Rapporteur: 
Mr Balducci suggested the use of a third containment barrier against risks, 
namely the immunological barrier. This should of course be used wherever 
possible, especially in the case of known human pathogens. In our work on 
rabies we make sure that all staff are immunized and that we have a suitable 
level of antibody before starting any work. There may be problems applying 
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With regard to Mr Stewart's question on the representation of different 
groupings on  local  safety committees, all  I  can say  is  that  we  do  have 
representatives from all areas within our own institute committee. This is 
fairly  general  policy  throughout  the  United  Kingdom.  In  fact,  GMAG 
recommend a more-or-less standard pattern of distribution of the committee 
membership. 
Mr Stewart also raised the possibility of the local safety committee having 
its recommendations ignored. In our own Institute, and I think this applies to 
the United Kingdom in general, if the committee got no response when the 
recommendation was passed through to the Safety Officer and the Director of 
the Institute, it would, if it was a question of human safety, have recourse to 
the Health & Safety Executive. If  it involved an animal disease, it would in our 
case be referred directly to me.  And if there was any risk of animal disease 
outside the Institute, I would be raising strong objections about that myself. 
To reply to Mr Bonety, guidelines for genetic manipulation work exist in 
the United Kingdom and of  course in the United States. In the field of  general 
laboratory safety, the WHO is fairly near to producing some safety guidelines 
for microbiology work. This could provide a  basis for more general safety 
guidelines  for  laboratories,  which  would  incluae  genetic  manipulation 
laboratories, particularly at the lower levels. 
Mr von der Decken wanted to know about the training and recruiting of 
safety staff. It is quite difficult to find trained staff. It  is almost always a case of 
trying to find the people and to train them specifically for the job. But again, it 
demands a sense of  vocation. Safety staff must, in a sense, be "born" and not 
"made". In the United Kingdom there are training courses for safety officers. 
These are run under various systems. Some of the polytechnics have courses 
for institute administrators which also cover safety requirements. Training of 
junior staff, I  think, has got to be  done at local level.  The WHO safety 
guidelines for microbiological laboratories will,  incidentally, include some 
quite extensive guidelines on training. 
Mr van Campen referred to the monitoring of risks, the notification of 
accidents and the exchange of information. We have very strict rules on the 
reporting of accidents. These are even stricter in the case of accidents which 
include any spillage or release of  viruses. We have a staff  fully conscious of  the 
risks involved. Undisclosed accidents of this sort causing contamination of 
which we  were unaware, might lead to a  virus escaping from our normal 
control and the restricted areas in which we operate. We therefore get very full 
information. This type of material is  not actually published. But all of our 
related operators in other countries, and certainly those on the Safety Officer 
Groups with which we are associated, get the benefit of any experience we 
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Mr Fiers  mentioned  the  problem of the  people  involved  in  industrial 
Scale-up being unaware of the risks. At the scale-up stage, I do feel that there 
must be an effort to get the characterized organism classified  by  suitable 
innocuity testing. It must be proven as safe, if it is going to be handled in an 
industrial environment which is even moderately open. I am referring here to 
a pathogen which has been completely immobilized and made non-hazardous 
in order to get a vaccine, an antigen which will stimulate antibody production 
but which has got no other undesirable factors present. 
Finally,  Mrs  Lund.  If you are  establishing a  level  of containment for 
gene-spliced organisms, it must be at least at the level of  the original organism 
involved, until such time as you prove its innocuity. DISCUSSION  SAFETY MEASURES 
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Experiments  with  recombinant  DNA  are  categorised according to  the 
estimate of their conjectural risks. The higher the category of containment, 
the smaller the chance that the micro-organisms involved can escape from the 
laboratory or survive in the environment. Most people now agree that, if the 
guidelines are observed, the risk of  escape and survival is extremely small. But 
theoretically there will  always remain a  certain risk  if work  is  done with 
pathogenic or potentially pathogenic micro-organisms. Therefore the health 
of  persons doing genetic manipulation work, should be monitored, mainly for 
two reasons. The first reason is  the protection of the health of the persons 
involved. The second reason is  that supervision of workers'  health gives 
information about the effectiveness of the containment measures taken. If 
anyone at all is at risk, it is th: investigator. 
Health Monitoring 
From the medical point of  view, the worker's own health can only be at risk 
if he works with pathogenic micro-organisms. It is therefore difficult to see the 
need for extra medical care if  experiments are done in Risk Group I as defined 
in  the  WHO  classification  system  for  pathogens  proposed  in  1979.  The 
experiments with micro-organisms which are not pathogenic to man belong 
to this Risk Group. Extra medical attention would only seem necessary for 
recombinant DNA experiments in  the Risk Groups II  through IV, which 
cover experiments with pathogenic organisms. 
A supervisory medical officer should be appointed, who is responsible for 
the supervision of the worker's health. But the worker himself shares a great 
deal of this responsibility. He should be aware of  the kind of work he is doing 
and the potential risks involved. If a person starts getting involved in genetic 
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should  be  performed.  During  the  examinations  some  general  contra-
indications to this type of  work, should be borne in mind. The same list can be 
used as contra-indications for continuing this kind of work. These general 
contra-indications are: 
1.  Evidence of immune disorders or impaired immune competence. 
2.  Treatment with immuno-suppressive drugs. 
3.  Treatment with antibiotics. 
It is known that antibiotics can change the bacterial flora of the gut. This 
may facilitate colonisation, even by the crippled E. coli Kl2, especially if 
the bacterium is  resistent to the antibiotic that is  used. Therefore, if a 
person starts using antibiotics he should temporarily stop working in the 
laboratory, until the course is finished. 
4.  General contra-indications like physical unsuitability. 
Physical  handicaps could make it difficult to perform the experiments 
according to the safety rules. Pregnancy cannot be considered a general 
contra-indication. It depends on the micro-organism or gene functions 
involved.  If the micro-organism or gene functions entail a  risk to the 
foetus, work should not be continued. 
From time to time, an unexplained illness will occur in one of  the workers. 
If  this happens, both the medical officer and the worker himself should keep 
in  mind the possibility of a l(:lboratory infection, especially if a laboratory 
accident has occurred prior to the illness. A thorough medical examination 
should be  carried out.  If a  laboratory infection  is  suspected, appropriate 
measures should be taken. Apart from the case of  an illness, it is difficult to see 
what can be gained by regular health check-ups. The same holds true for 
regular serological controls unless  there  is  a  special reason for it and an 
appropriate test to do. 
There is  no evidence that DNA-recombination experiments involve any 
long-term health hazards.  However, suspicion about this may arise later. 
Accordingly, it is important that morbidity and mortality data ofthe workers 
are available. This does not mean that all these data should be registered by 
the supervisory medical officer, but they should be accessible. This will make 
it possible to do a retrospective investigation if necessary. 
Investigator as a Link between Laboratory and Environment 
The  risk  of a  worker  who  is  doing  DNA-recombination  experiments 
becoming ill is thought to be extremely small. Nonetheless, we should think 
about what happens if an investigator doing this kind of work gets a disease 
that is caused by the micro-organism he has been working with. The risk for 
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genicity of the micro-organism involved. Much more important is the way in 
which this micro-organism can be transmitted to other people. For example 
yellow fever is caused by a virus belonging to the arbovirus group. Yell ow 
fever  is  a severe disease with a case fatality of 5 %.  Yell ow fever virus can 
therefore be called a pathogenic micro-organism. This virus cannot, however, 
be transmitted from man to man. There is a mosquito that acts as a vector for 
the virus, and it  is  by an infected mosquito that man becomes infected. 
Another example is cholera. Cholera is caused by a bacterium. To get infected 
one has to swallow a relatively large number of bacteria. Only then can the 
cholera bacilli colonise the gut and cause illness. The disease is not transmitted 
from man to man under hygienic circumstances. Spread of  this disease occurs 
via water or food, in which the bacilli can multiply. After this multiplication 
there are enough micro-organisms to infect people. Here again it is not the 
pathogenicity of the micro-organisms that is of primary importance, but the 
route of transmission. 
In most ON  A-recombination experiments, E. coli is used '!S the host cell for 
DNA-clones. For these experiments a crippled strain is  used that does not 
colonise the human gut. E. coli, the normal strain, lives in the gut. 
There do exist certain strains of  E. coli which are pathogenic for man. They 
cause gastro-enteritis, with diarrhoea as its main symptom. To get infected 
with this pathogenic strain of E. coli, it is necessary to swallow a large number 
of micro-organisms. Transmission from man to man does not occur under 
hygienic circumstances. Food or water have to act as an intermediate. It is the 
same situation as with the spread of  cholera. This means that even if an E. coli 
K 12,  used for DNA-recombination experiments, becomes pathogenic and 
infects an investigator, both highly  unlikely events, even then the risk of 
transmission  to  other people  is  extremely small,  too· small  to be  of any 
importance. 
For  almost  a  century,  work  has  been  done  with  pathogenic  micro-
organisms in  thousands of laboratories all over the world.  In earlier times 
experiments with  highly pathogenic organisms were done under primitive 
circumstances. Occasionally it has happened that laboratory workers became 
infected with the micro-organisms they were working with. In a few cases this 
has  resulted in  small outbreaks.  However, large scale outbreaks in  which 
transmission occurred from the laboratory worker to others around him, 
have never been recorded. 
So, even if an investigator doing ON  A-recombination experiments becomes 
infected with the micro-organism he is  working with, the risk that he  will 
transmit this micro-organism to his environment is extremely small. 
The  possible  hazards  of  the  recombinant  DNA  technology  for  the 
investigators and the environment have been overestimated. This does not 
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committees in different countries, can now be simply abolished. It does mean, 
however, that these guidelines should be implemented in a more sensible way. 
Safety should be guaranteed for the investigators and the environment, but at 
the same time the experiments should not be unnecessarily hampered. 
DISCUSSION 
Mr Herbig: 
If a  sufficient  number  of medical  specialists,  i.e.  epidemiologists  and 
medical microbiologists, had been involved in  the DNA debate in the 1974-
1976 period, would we have had fewer formal regulations? 
Mr Coutinho, Rapporteur: 
The involvement of medical  microbiologists and epidemiologists in  the 
early  ON A  debate,  would  not,  I  think,  have  changed  the outcome.  The 
techniques were new to them too. And understanding takes time. 
Mr Sgaramella: 
We would be seriously shortsighted if we  simply continue to discuss the 
risks associated with the use of recombinant DNA. Unlike 1974-1975, we now 
know that new combinations of  genes can be achieved using other techniques, 
including micro-injection and cell fusion. These techniques could produce 
results which are less predictable and therefore more dangerous than anything 
that could be obtained through  recombinant  DNA.  Personally,  I do not 
believe that it is  necessary to control these with a Directive. The results may 
turn out to be very positive and the risks perfectly manageable. Yet, it  is  on 
these issues that we could have a worthwhile debate. Not on RON A which, in 
itself, is just a technique, nothing more. 
Mr Herbig: 
Looking back over the ON A debate in the United States, there is a lesson to 
be drawn. When a  particular group, using whatever kind of provisions or 
directives, attempts to regulate itself, it gives rise to public suspicion that there 
is an attempt to do an internal deal. The involvement of  a sufficient number of 
independent specialists would have led to a freer discussion and greater public 
confidence. 
Mr Williams: 
In response to Dr Coutinho's paper, I do not believe that infections with 
recombinant E.  coli are the central concern. Taking the example of E.  coli 
converted to produce human growth hormone, the fear is  not that coloni-
sation of man would produce a  urinary tract infection, but that it  would 
produce a giant. However, investigations in recent years have shown that the 
total conversion of the E.  coli of the gut into growth hormone producers, 
would be barely enough to make any alteration to the total amount of human 
growth hormone produced in  the normal body. If the epidemiologists had 
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very unlikely that E.  coli would have the qualities, or could be endowed with 
the qualities, which would enable it to spread in epidemic fashion from person 
to person. 
Mr Stewart: 
Although I seem to be a lone voice in the wilderness, I would strongly hold 
to the view that the lowering of  safety norms is not simply a rational response 
to the acquisition of new scientific knowledge. In the United States in 1977, 
Roy Curtiss II I sent an open letter to Donald Frederickson, Director of the 
NIH. He set out in detail the arguments which led him personally to believe 
that the risks had been seriously overestimated back in  1974. The letter was 
very influential at the time in reducing the safety norms. Yet, since then, a 
number of  detailed technical criticisms have been made of  Curtiss' letter. Even 
Curtiss himself recognized a number of these errors. But no effort has been 
made to tighten up the safety norms accordingly. 
The  initial  NIH  Guidelines  were  introduced  following  detailed  public 
debate. But the norms have been dramatically lowered since then without a 
public investigation of anything like the same quality. The current consensus 
is  purely an internal one within the community of interested scientists and 
industrialists. When people start saying to each other:"  The risks do not exist", 
it  becomes very difficult to maintain a contrary opinion. But as a geneticist, 
these arguments have not satisfied my scientific j,udgement. 
The Chairman, Mrs Heuser: 
Perhaps  Dr  Coutinho  would  reply,  imffcating  whether  he  believes  a 
lowering of safety norms would carry an increased health risk. 
Mr Coutinho, Rapporteur: 
Changing the guidelines will  not,  I  think, involve greater risks.  It only 
means that these guidelines have to be upheld and applied in a sensible way. 
To come back to Mr Williams, I was not only talking about disease. I was 
also talking about infections. Even if there was such a thing as a cancer gene, 
and if it  is  transmitted from  man  to  man, then you  need an  infection to 
transmit it. 
Mr Sgaramella: 
I would like to point out to Mr Stewart that all the results of recent risk 
assessment work done in the United Kingdom, by the NIH, and by EMBO in 
Heidelberg have been given wide publicity and are available to anyone who 
cares to read them. 
Mr Dunican: 
We have seen that there is a fair degree of harmony between the voluntary 
guidelines for recombinant DNA work operating in the European countries. 
But in a number of countries, the cultivation of pathogens in labora.tories is 
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Secondly, it is frequently suggested that, when dealing with real pathogens, 
serum samples be kept. I am not a medical person, but I am not quite sure of 
the value of the procedure, the medical supervision required, and what one 
does with the serum samples after a period of time. Perhaps they could be 
useful for long-term epidemiological studies. 
Finally, it was suggested that the medical histories of laboratory workers 
should be made available in case of necessity. Medical histories are private 
and personal. They should be made available to the medical supervisor or 
someone like that. They should not be generally available. 
Mr Fiers: 
It cannot  be  accepted  that  the  relaxation of the  NIH  Guidelines  was 
decided internally by the scientific community. It came about as a result of a 
special  conference attended by  both American and European virologists. 
Criticism was invited from all sides. The ensuing relaxation of  the Guidelines 
was based on detailed evaluation. The proceedings of the Conference were 
published. 
Mr  Buringh: 
There is indeed a requirement for norms to cover work with pathogens. It 
should be included in a European Community measure. 
In addition to the microbiological aspects, attention should be given to the 
new types of product which will  be launched on the market as a  result of 
recombinant DNA techniques. As the number of these products is  likely to 
grow rapidly, there is  a need to look at their toxicity, etc. 
Mr Busi: 
From the discussion, it  would appear that the relaxation of the United 
States Guidelines has been based more on what has not happened rather than 
on any concrete results of risk  evaluation research.  Accordingly,  I  would 
again put the question: what proportion of the total R & D effort, in terms of 
money and manhours, is  devoted specifically to risk assessment? 
Mr Coutinho,  Rapporteur: 
I agree that the medical histories of individual patients should not be made 
generally available. But they should be accessible. The supervising Medical 
Officer should not register these data himself but he should know the name of 
the general practitioner of  the person involved, so that the information can be 
obtained, if there is  a suspicion of a certain risk. 
I agree that it is strange that there are no explicit guidelines for work with 
pathogens. I work in such a laboratory every day. There are no real guidelines, 
recommended or enforced, as  there are for recombinant DNA.  I  think it 
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Mr  Koch: 
It is interesting to note that the World Health Organization is in the final 
stages of issuing guidelines for work with pathogenic micro-organisms. With 
the same aim the Howie report has been published in the United Kingdom. In 
the Federal Republic of Germany, a code of good laboratory practice in the 
microbiology laboratory will be published shortly. All these have come about 
as a direct spin-off of  the safety debate on genetic engineering. To this extent, 
the debate has been a necessary and in the end very fruitful exercise. Genetic 
engineering itself should only be regarded as one aspect of work with micro-
organisms  and  should  not  be  stigmatised  by  being  the  only  area  with 
guidelines. 
Mrs  Lund: 
In  Denmark, we  are against having over-rigid rules.  Precisely for safety 
reasons. You can have elaborate biological containment systems and all sorts 
of fancy equipment, but it can be counterproductive if not properly used and 
understood. The main need is  for good microbiological practice. We have 
found that a better safety atmosphere can be created on a voluntary basis. By 
visiting the laboratories and discussing individual problems and solutions you 
create an awareness which gives a much higher level of  safety than by having 
strict formal rules. 
Mr Nuesch: 
As a representative of a small third country, I would like to back up this 
view. In Switzerland, we have accepted the American Guidelines since 1976. 
All work is registered annually on a voluntary basis. We have also taken the 
view from the outset that the safety aspects would probably be covered by our 
Epidemics Law which is  valid for the whole country. We have also tried to 
organize  courses  on  good  microbiological  practice  on  an  ongoing  basis 
through  the  Swiss  Society  for  Microbiology.  We  feel  that  a  pragmatic 
approach based on a clear policy has a lot to offer. PAPLR 
Mr  Schum~nn, 
Rapporteur 
TOPIC E:  ETHICS 
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In honouring me today with an invitation to your colloquy, I do not know 
whether you  are doing so  because, as  the  minister in  charge of scientific 
research in  my country many years ago now, I played some part in setting up 
the  European  Molecular  Biology  Organisation  EMBO, or because,  many 
years later, I called one of the chapters in my book "Anguish and Certainty" on 
the mystery of life "From the Molecule to the Anti-destiny." But whatever the 
reason, it  is to my incompetence in scientific matters that you have appealed. 
To  justify this deserved reputation of mine,  I shall  limit  my  talk to the 
metaphysical,  ethical  and  political  aspects  of the  ON A  issue,  the  third 
following on from the first  two. 
Let  us first  take the metaphysical aspect. 
On 4 November 1946, in the great amphitheatre of the Sorbonne in  Paris, 
Andre Malraux celebrated the birth of UNESCO with the words:" We could 
rmlr base a human attiTude on rhe tragic, because Man does nor knmr 11·here he is 
going.  and on humanism, because he knoll's 1rhar his sTarting point is." 
What doctrine, what science was ever more sure than molecular biology 
about knowing where Man comes from and about not knowing where he  is 
going'? But Andre Malraux lived long enough to see. Twice at least, and both 
times in my presence. Once when he gave his academy member's sword to an 
illustrious doctor-writer, Professor Hamburger, and once when he  received 
the Nehru prize in  New Delhi, when the author of "Lazarus". who had just 
returned from  the  borderland between  thinking about and actually expe-
riencing  death  (for  he  had  been  very  seriously  ill)  produced a  new  and 
profound  view  on  Jean  Hamburger's  book  "Pmrer  and Fragility",  that 
molecular biology was taking over the next relay stage of history. 
But what does this mean exactly'? Think of  a French historian like Michelet, 
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Marx. They all  achieved a  wide audience because their aim  was  to make 
mankind's  adventure  intelligible.  Through  them,  history  ceased  to  be  a 
revelation of  the past and became, more or less confusedly, a way of mapping 
out the future.  As early as  the eighteenth century, Condorcet, in  a  book 
entitled ",\'ketches of  a Historical Tableau of  the Progress of  the Human Spirit", 
wrote:''((  Man managed to predict  phenom~na  whose !all's he kn01rs.  why would 
he think it pointless to sketch out a probable scenariofor thefuture of  the human 
species in  the light of  its past history?" Today. the interest which the entire 
western world is  showing in  biology arises out of the same fascination.  If 
today's biologists, instead of imposing on themselves the same discipline as 
their predecessors, are probing into the very nature of life itself "with the 
caution of  the hunter and the delicacy of  the surgeon". as Andre Malraux put it, 
it is because they, in their turn, nurse the ambition of"assuming the mantle of 
destiny".  In the last analysis, the difference between the "new" and the "old" 
biology is the same as that between narrative history and the prophetic history 
of someone like Oswald Spengler, author of "The Decline of  the West".  A 
biology which the human species expects to give an account of  its adventure is 
an anti-destiny. 
I should like to sum up this first aspect by a sentence which, although a little 
superficial,  does,  I  hope,  crystallise  the  basic  ideas:  "Physics  cod(fv  the 
inevitable.  biology  cod((ies  the  possible.  and molecular biology is  a  sort of 
dialogue between the inevitable and the possible". 
This dialogue places Man before the problem of his freedom. The time has 
therefore come for us to move from the metaphysical to our second aspect, the 
ethical. 
Is it possible to talk about molecular determinism in the same way as one 
talks  about  historical  determinism? To  this  question  France's  two  most 
famous molecular biologists, Professor Jacob and Professor Monod, both of 
whom  have  been  awarded  the  Nobel  Prize,  have  given  two  conflicting 
answers. To  begin with, they agree about what they call "the philosopher's 
stone" of  biology arid the dream of the bacterial cell, which they describe in a 
language that fully  reveals the poetic bent of their thought. These images 
translate  two  bold  and  simple  concepts  by  two  words:  emergence  and 
teleonomy, the two properties by which living beings are differentiated from 
non-living  objects  or  systems.  Emergence  is  the  aptitude  to  reproduce 
structures of  growing complexity. the philosopher's stone on which it is based 
being DNA, an ingredient of chromosomes and the guardian of heredity. 
Teleonomy  is  the  synonym  which  a  certain  "objective  modesty"  (the 
expression is  that of Professor Monod himself) has substituted for "adap-
tation".  Is this a confession, an observation? The structure of living things 
would be no different if it had been conceived with an end in view: the survival 
of  the individual and, above all, the survival of  the species. These two essential 
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programme provided for by heredity. "((there are 261etters in my alphabet", 
wrote Pr9fessor Jacob, "4 are used to compose the chemical message through 
ll'hich  heredity is  determined.  Mutations result from  errors similar to  those 
introduced into a text by a transcriber or printer. ff  one B among the millions of 
others is changed into an  A.  or an  A into a B.  the  H'ord or sentence is made 
unrecognisableforever although the alphabet itse(fis not changed". Up to this 
point, and as  long as  they stick  to scientific observation, the pioneers of 
molecular biology agree with  each other completely.  But  as  soon as they 
approach the limits of their knowledge and are obliged to conjecture, then 
their views and philosophies all  differ.  And the point where they separate 
from each other is the dividing line between nuclear mechanisms and nervous 
and cerebral mechanisms. 
To show what I mean, I shall compare for you the two inaugural addresses 
of Professor Jacob and Professor Monod to the College de France. On 7 May 
1965, when Professor Jacob took his seat in the College for the first time, he 
said:" We are total(l' ~norant ofthe molecular language of  the nervous system. 
the code in  11·hich memory is expressed. The geneticist is convinced that there can 
be no question of the over-rigid language authorised by the nucleic alphabet. 
No-one could envisage memory 1rithout the existence of  innumerable relays and 
high(v complex circuits.  But are  the knoll'ledge of structures and the  under-
standing a,( mechanisms sufficient to explain such complex processes as thought? 
Is  there  any  chance  of one  day  expressing  in  the  language  of physics  and 
chemistry the interactions 1rhich give rise to a thought. a decision or a feeling? 
There are grounds for not believing so." 
On 3 November 1967, it was Professor Monod's turn to take his seat in the 
College de France, and everything he said was a direct contradiction of the 
thesis of Professor Jacob as summarised in the passage I have just quoted to 
you.  His point of departure was the discovery of the so-called "allosteric" 
proteins, whose structure is  such that "they can cause links to form betll'een 
bodies 1rhich ll'ould have absolutely no chemical a.ffinityfor each other if  left on 
their Ol\'11 and  betll'een ll'hich no exchange o.f energy ll'ould normally be possible". 
"My faith in  the unity o.f the living 1\'orld",  Professor Monod said, "ll'ould be 
disappointed ({this prodigious organ of  teleonomic co-ordination.  the central 
nervous system o.f Man.  did not use this molecular means o.f communication, 
already  discovered by bacteria.  1rhich  is  represented by "allosteric"  inter-
actions". And he added: "Let us suppose that this hypothesis is true.  Would ll'e 
then have the right to say that 1re are acquainted ll'ith  the ultimate physical 
support  o.f thought.  o.f conscience.  o.f knoll'ledge,  o.f poetry.  o.f political or 
religious ideas.  of the most noble plans or the most base ambitions? Yes,  ll'e 
ll'ould have to say that all that. all these beings ll'hich live ll'ithin us,  are in fact 
contained.  inscribed  H'ithin  the  geometric deformations  o.f billions  o.f small 
molecular oystals". 
All  in all, molecular biology may lead to two concepts of heredity: 70  ETHICS  PAPER 
- Either there are two systems of heredity, the first determined by a 
chemical message inscribed along the chromosomes, the second free 
from all form of planning, with its meaning capable of  being modified 
by the effects of  experience, the action ofthe environment, words and 
writing; 
- Or the unity of the living world 'requires that any specificity of Man's 
central  nervous system, i.e.  the  realm of ideas and  knowledge, be 
denied and that any transmissible feeling  or thought  be  an auto-
nomous  being  endowed  with  the  same  emergence  and  the  same 
adaptation as the bacterial cell. 
From the confession of Monad himself, this latter view is conjectural and 
hypothetical. Both must be used to deduce a DNA policy adapted to the road 
leading from the molecule to the anti-destiny. 
This policy (and here we are coming to our last part) must be the subject of 
two choices, depending on whether it  is  a  question of the foundations of 
society in general or the attitude of the public authorities towards genetic 
manipulation. 
Let us therefore look first at the foundations of society in general. 
It has been too easily forgotten that as soon as it  was born, molecular 
biology  was  put on trial  by Moscow.  Remember the controversy, which 
continued into the gulags, between Michurin and Lysenko, who has rightly 
been called the "Rasputin of  biology".  What was at stake in  this trial, this 
controversy which, I repeat, ended in police repression, was whether acquired 
characteristics could be passed on to future generations. It was Stalin who 
decided. The doctrine of hereditary transmission offered too many advantages 
to a dictatorial power for him to think twice about imposing it. 
What a  temptation, for any dictator, to be able to manufacture docile 
citizens, robots who would in their turn give birth to other robots! 
At the time, DNA had already been isolated. So none of those who were 
investigating its structure could become or remain Stalinist without disowning 
their work. For them the crux of  the nucleic message was that lessons could not 
be  received from the environment, and that modifications could only take 
place according to the whims of  the"  order of/etters". Thus from one moment 
to the next, and in spite of  themselves, the pioneers of  the new biology became 
counter-revolutionaries in the Stalinist lexicon. 
ON A has been heretical since 1950 because it promises Man a genesis from 
within.  It was  this  very  issue  which  caused  the  break  between  Professor 
Monad and the Communist Party, with which he sympathised. He was asked 
to  lecture on the quarrel  between  Michurin and  Lysenko. Of course, he 
concluded that Lysenko's doctrines did not hold water and that it was not 
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·decided that Michurin was right. A few days later he received a letter, which he 
showed  to  me,  in  which  he  was  asked  to criticise  himself and reverse  his 
conclusions so that they concurred with those of  Stalin. Naturally he refused, 
and that caused the break. 
Monod accepted all the consequences of this misadventure. According to 
him, knowledge is  not a means, it  is  an end in  itself.  Research must not be 
influenced  even  by  a search for  a sovereign  good or for  the  happiness of 
mankind. But for it to be an end in  itself, certain moral, social and political 
conditions must be fulfilled.  He himself listed them in  the following terms: 
"Scorn for violence and temporal domination, persona/freedom and a constant 
calling into question considered as a duty".  In other words, the biologist can 
only make his own adventure intelligible to mankind in a community based 
on  the  rejection  of all  forms  of totalitarianism,  including  ideologies  and 
regimes. 
So much for the first of the two points we should deal with in our last part: 
the  foundations  of society  in  general  seen  through  the  morality  of the 
biologist. 
The second aspect  is  the attitude of the  powers-that-be towards genetic 
manipulation.  Is  the  policy  of a democratic power  towards genetic  mani-
pulation determined in advance only by the limits defined by Monod? More 
precisely,  is  a scientist who  is  entirely free  in  his  research, who works like 
Michurin could have worked in his own country if there had been no Lysenko, 
free  from  the obligation to ask  himself questions, not like  Monod on the 
conditions, but on the "moral, social and political" consequences of genetic 
manipulation? 
The problem of conditions has been examined by us through Monod. Now 
we  must turn to the problem of consequences. 
It is  no accident that the anguish of a Jean Rostand, for example, at the 
progress of his discipline is like that of an Oppenheimer or an Otto Kahn at 
the military uses of the atom. There is a book about the internal reflections 
and  the  public  declarations  of atomic  physicists  at  the  time  of the  first 
successful explosion of an atomic bomb. 
These  words  are  quite  astonishing,  even  upsetting.  Although  these 
scientists  were  all  atheists  or agnostics,  their  language  suddenly  became 
brutally theological." We have pelformed the ll'ork oft  he devil." "Godll'ill not 
permit it." "We are  no11· at the edge of mystery." etc.  The language of the 
molecular biologist a'nd  the chemist at the realisation of the implications of 
their discovery is much the same as that I have just mentioned. Let us confine 
ourselves to Jean Rostand who said: "We are going to learn to change Man 
before knoll'ing ll'hat  he is." And:  "Is Man  capable of  handling the chemical 
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bewildered  gods  ll'ho  will  have  everything  explained  but  will  understand 
nothing?" 
Was it the same anguish which on 26 July 1974 led one of the pioneers of 
genetic  engineering,  Professor  Paul  Berg,  to  call  for  a  moratorium  on 
research? He gave many reasons for doing so. These are not contradictory, 
they are complementary. 
As  you  are  aware,  there  was  no  moratorium.  On  6  November  1977, 
biologists succeeded in  making a  human hormone for the first time, a  real 
brain hormone, from a bacterium. This prestigious feat, the synthetic creation 
of a brain hormone, which Professor Berg had feared, had succeeded. Man 
had entrusted his mission to one of the billions of coli bacilli which make up 
our internal flora. 
Why? Because bacteria -despite their primitiveness- follow the same 
genetic code as our chromosomes. What a marvellous body of  laws direct the 
unity of the living world! 
But would this somatostatin (that was its name) bring happiness or terror? 
Would it  lead for example to enzymes which would provide sugar for the 
starving  or  would  it  lead  to  tailor-made  human  beings,  replicas  of the 
chimeras conjured up by the nightmares of the poets? 
This was the important question. 
I had the privilege of discussing it above the Atlantic with another French 
Nobel prize winner, Professor Dausset. "My impression".  I told him, "11·as 
that our fears  11·ere  groundless; since the creation of  a brain hormone from a . 
collibacil/us. developments in science had  been more promising. more reassuring 
than disquieting, at leastfor a layman like myse(f What do you think. Professor? 
For example ll'e have discovered a gr01rth hormone ll'hich can be used to combat 
dll'm:fism.  lntelferon opens up ne11·  vistas for the battle against cancer and has 
been recently tested on human beings".  Professor Dausset replied: "Yes. but 
don't go toofast. Genetic engineering itse({ll'i/1 soon be outdated. The moment 
may come. and  it may come soon. ll'hen a gene can be introduced into a cell.  Then 
~fa gene can be introduced into a sperm cell,  there ll'lll be a major risk that men 
ll'i/1 be programmed by men." 
These were the actual words used by Professor Dausset. I wrote them down 
immediately and I am quoting them publicly for the first time. I was, however, 
imprudent enough to reply in  my supreme ignorance; "Mankind ll'i/1 not be 
had so easily, ll'i/1 not let itself  be programmed so easilv. /fholl'ever. I am correct, 
that is exactly what your amazing discovery of  HLA (Human Leucocyte Antigen) 
has just sholl'n. 
White blood cells. just like red blood cells, are carriers of  cellular markers; they 
are the key to human individuality,  the biological definition of the individual. 
Yes.  blood groups distinguish men from all others.  And.  ll'e should add.  blood DISCUSSION  ETHICS 
groups  distinguish  men from  other  men.  But  it  i.s  the  human  brain  ll'hich 
distinguishes man from the animals.  by the .skills ll'hich  he acquires after hi.s 
birth. 
Now, . the brain i.s not a computer from ll'hich man can only retrieve ll'hat he 
put.s  in.  It i.s  a chemical plant where new.  unforeseen combinations are being 
manufactured continually." The dialogue ends here. 
This brings us back to the major controversy between Jacob and Monod. 
Can the language of physics and chemistry ever challenge the sum of the 
interactions which produce a thought or a feeling? 
The triple lesson of our metaphysical, ethical and political survey is clear. 
The nucleic message starts with the freedom of man, leads to the responsibility 
of man and never stops. As Andre Malraux said: "Thought i.s something to be 
conquered,  not something to be repeated". 
DISCUSSIO~ 
Mr Mouton: 
I was once asked by Prof. Andre Dumas what I, as a biologist, thought of 
Monod's position on random mutation. I studied the ON A repair functions 
which  are  genetically  controlled  and  which  determine  the  outcome  of 
premutational  damage.  The  damage  can  occur  randomly,  but  not  the 
mutations themselves. I put the question to Fran~ois Jacob, who replied that 
it was dealt with in his book "The Logic of  Living". I was then able to reply to 
Prof. Dumas:" Yes.  mutations exist. but they are not random." At present we 
know of six  different  DNA repair systems. These correct not only DNA 
strand damage, but also improper base pairings resulting from environmental 
factors affecting the DNA, such as radiation or DNA-insulting chemicals. 
These could be a basic cause of mutagenesis and evolution. Personally, I agree 
with Prof. Jacob for scientific reasons. 
On  behalf of the  European  Ecumenical  Commission  for  Church and 
Society, I have already pointed out in  a  written submission that whenever 
science  advances, endowing  Man  with  new  power over  himself and  his 
environment, the question arises of whether the ethics of the discoverer will, 
or can, develop to encompass the new field. 
Will society let him act as its conscience, as in his duty- you do not give 
matches to little children- and grant him the right of veto if his discovery is 
used for violent, unethical ends? The precedent created by Curie, Einstein, 
Szilard, Oppenhcimer and Teller in respect of  atomic fission and then fusion is 
still a live issue since the present generation of nuclear weapons is capable of 
destroying the population of the Earth 20 to 80 times over. 
Besides the risks inherent in  genetic manipulation even for the peaceful, 
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a blind eye to its use for violent, not only military but also civil, ends'? Forced 
biological production is already with us (chickens, hormone-fed calves, plant 
selection carried to extremes with long-term reduction of the "genetic pool"). 
Its justification is  efficiency, which  is  another expression of the  law  of the 
strongest.  The  test-tube  baby  exists.  How  long  before  we  have  molecular 
racism'? 
"Genetics puts Ethics on  the spot". So  much the better. Science demands 
that we make up our minds: either progress is accompanied by an attitude of 
modesty, respect for Man and his environment, or we  go the way  of other 
civilizations,  kill  ourselves  by  our own  arrogance, intoxicated by  a power 
which has gone to our heads, mistaking the Tree of Knowledge of Good and 
Evil  for the Tree of Scientific Knowledge. 
Mr Winkler: 
The misuse of recombinant ON A is mentioned in  Rostand's book. It also 
came up in yesterday's debate. All knowledge and technology can, of course, 
be misused. However, pathogenic bacteria and viruses have been selected by 
nature over  millions of years.  During all  that time,  they  have,  through the 
process of mutation and natural selection, adapted themselves to overcome 
thousands of unknown defense factors in the host. They have perfected their 
own  agressive  characteristics.  Although  Man  has  tried  to  increase  the 
virulence of certain organisms either for noble or ignoble purposes, he  has 
always failed. 
Man  cannot match  what  nature has  taken so  long to  achieve.  I do  not 
believe that the recombinant ON A technique will  produce a new  pathogen 
within the next  25  years.  Even  if it  did, the pathogen would be a costly and 
complex  weapon  to  use.  The  aggressor would  have  to  immunize  his  own 
people  first.  The  result  would  be  unreliable  and  dependent  on  weather 
conditions. An  available pathogen would be  much  easier to  use.  The only 
relevance the recombinant DNA technique could have in this field would be 
to _mask the organism a bit, thus making detection somewhat more difficult. 
Mr  Buringh: 
It is interesting that Mr Schumann, in adopting a metaphysical approach to 
the ethical issues, should come directly to the question of freedom. This in 
turn  raises  the  issue  of  how  freedom  should  be  allocated  to  different 
individuals and groups. The one word I missed, was "democracy". It means 
involvement  in  decisions  relating to  research  and production. This  aspect 
features strongly in  recombinant DNA discussions in  the Netherlands. The 
issue is not specific to the RONA field. Two examples show, however, why it is 
significant  h~.:re. 
The  pharmaceutical  industry  in  the  Netherlands  has  linked  its  insulin 
production closely  with  pig  abattoirs.  Competition from  RON A processes 
could put these units out of business, with a consequent loss of jobs. 76  ETHICS  DISCUSSION 
Secondly, RON A could.be used to produce basic industrial chemicals such 
as propylene oxide. It would use less energy than conventional processes. 
Shell is interested in this research and is involved in a biotechnology company 
in  the Netherlands, whose shares have doubled in value over the last year. 
For  the  trade  union  movement,  it  means  that  there  must  be  more 
democratic control. The question is:  how can the individual and interest 
groups win a greater say over the direction of scientific and technological 
development. 
Mr Fiers: 
There is almost unanimous agreement in the scientific world that mutations 
occur at random. In certain DNA sequences, they might be more frequent if 
they  are  exposed  to  ultraviolet  radiation.  But  overall  they  are  random. 
Because they had to withstand higher ultraviolet radiation levels during the 
course of  evolution, all organisms have built-in repair mechanisms. These are 
designed to identify and repair any changes in  DNA. But the repair is  only 
partial, the proportion depending on the type of  damage. This phenomenon, 
however, in  no way contradicts the random nature of mutations. 
I fully support the basic thinking in Mr Schumann's excellent introduction. 
However, I have a number of specific comments. While there is an apparent 
divergence, there is no fundamental scientific contradiction between Monod 
and Jacob. The hereditary information which is  transferred to offspring, is 
carried by  DNA. On the other hand, changes can come about within the 
individual through the allosteric proteins. But it  must be remembered that 
these allosteric proteins are themselves coded by DNA. This means that the 
organism possesses from birth the information to build the allosteric proteins. 
At  the  same  time,  these  proteins  can  be  modelled  by  the· individual's 
upbringing, experience and education, as if it were a kind of plasticine. There 
is  thus no contradiction between the two systems. 
Despite the widespread view to the contrary, the moratorium proposed by 
Paul Berg and his colleagues was not a general one. It was quite specifically 
aimed  at  two  types  of experiment.  The  first  concerned  the  transfer  of 
antibiotic-resistant  markers  to  other  types  of organism  which  did  not 
naturally have them. This is  a very logical suggestion and to my knowledge 
still  holds. Secondly, care should be  taken  with experiments which  might 
transfer genetic information with might, under certain conditions, code for 
tumor-causing genes. Furthermore, the moratorium would only apply until 
work assessing the risks of such experiments had been completed. Following 
the Asilomar debate, at which several of us here were present, this work was 
carried out. Experiments on worst case scenarios were undertaken partly in 
Europe, under the guidance of EMBO but more extensively in  the United 
States. 
The results of this risk assessment work led, inter alia, to the Ann Arbor 
Conference.  Here, nearly all  the signatories of Paul  Berg's original letter DISCUSSION  ETHICS  77 
recanted. They requested that the NIH Guidelines be relaxed, and this later 
came about. 
Finally, I would like to emphasize the importance of the parallel which 
Mr Schumann has drawn with the Lysenko era in the Soviet Union. It was not 
simply a question of  the suppression of  scientists' rights. It also had enormous 
·- practical consequences.  Because of the support that  Lysenko got for his 
non-scientific methods, an enormous gap opened up in the field of  scientific 
research  which  is  still  visible  decades  later.  The shortfall  in  Soviet  food 
production can be partly ascribed to the lack of high-yielding crop varieties 
suited to the particular climate. This was caused by the ban on true genetic 
research on plant strain improvement. 
The same situation applies to recombinant ON  A. Hepatitis 8 is particularly 
widespread in the Third World. It can only be tackled with vaccines developed 
through RON A.  Malaria is  a serious disease affecting between 200 and 600 
million people and vaccines can be developed through RONA techniques. 
Thus, the decisions which are taken do not just affect fundamental scientific 
research.  They  also  have  enormous  consequences  for  the  well-being  of 
mankind. 
Mr Puglisi: 
Mr  Schumann  has  depicted  heredity  as  a  perfect,  watertight  system. 
However,  while  the  hereditary  message  contained in  the  chromosome  is 
determined  by  ON A,  it  may  also  be  influenced  by  factors  such  as  the 
environment, growth conditions, antibiotics and certain metals. Secondly, 
there is the generally accepted claim that the genetic code is universal. Once 
again,  there  are  certain  subcellular  organelles such  as  mitochondria and 
chloroplasts and probably also certain sections of  tissue which have a genetic 
code which is not the same as the nucleic code. These introduce elements of 
internal flexibility into the biological system, which do not fit in with the harsh 
determinism with which Monod concludes his book. 
Mr Stewart: 
Mr Schumann reminded us of  the dangers of  Stalinist totalitarianism. That 
nightmare was depicted in  English literature in  George Orwell's "Nineteen 
eighty-four". A book by another English writer, Aldous Huxley's "Brave New 
World",  also appeared around the same time.  His prescience  is  uncanny. 
Huxley thought it would take a thousand years for his particular nightmare to 
happen. Now, only fifty years later, we find ourselves developing the entire 
technological base for that society. Genetic engineering is only one of many 
technological developments. Yet taking them together, we  now possess the 
entire arsenal  of techniques for  the  biological  and  psychological  control 
envisaged by Huxley. 
There is  also widespread unease at present that genetic engineering, and 
more generally biotechnology, rest in  the hands of multinational concerns. FTHICS  DISCUSSION 
Since  the  goals of the  multinationals do  not  always correspond  with  the 
interests of society, I think we have good reason to be concerned. If we are to 
avoid Huxley's scenario we must bring greater participation and democracy 
to the decision-making which governs both the development and application 
of biotechnology. 
Mr Sgaramella: 
I think Mr Stewart is making a major error in  mixing science-fiction with 
science. We must not confuse the fantastic scenarios depicted by Huxley and 
Orwell with a realistic assessment of what is scientifically possible, now and in 
the years ahead.  I am not, however, referring to things which  may  become 
possible in  the very distant future. 
Mr Stewart, in his written submission, referred to biological warfare aimed 
at specific civilian groups. What does he  mean when  he  talks of a "criminal 
chromosome"'? There is no scientific basis for these claims. None whatsoever. 
This is  cultural terrorism. As for the genetic components of schizophrenia, 
these are very difficult to define and certainly involve more than one gene. 
Like all other factors affecting human behaviour, it lies completely outside the 
scope  of genetic  manipulation.  Science-fiction  has  an  important  social 
function.  But  we should try to keep the discussion on a realistic plane. 
Mr Bonety: 
I feel  I must reply to Mr Sgaramella. 
For many years, I have worked in  Electricite de  France alongside nuclear 
engineers. What always struck me was their feeling of  absolute certainty, their 
total refusal to question anything. When I was nominated as  Rapporteur for 
the Economic and Social Committee's Study on a Community Nuclear Safety 
Code I came into a lot of criticism from these colleagues. But I told them: "The 
longer there is controversy the better". When the point of absolute certainty is 
reached,  there  is  no  longer  any  opportunity  to  criticize.  There  is  no 
involvement  of the  trade  unions  and  non-establishment groupings  in  the 
democratic process. Science is then no longer guided in the interests of  society. 
One  of the  key  points underlined  by  Mr  Schumann  was  the  duty  of the 
scientist to constantly maintain a critical approach. Mr Stewart's concerns are 
therefore perfectly legitimate. The interests of society as a whole can only be 
safeguarded by a permanent debate between the scientific experts who make 
proposals and those who will  then decide on their application. 
His point in relation to multinationals is equally relevant. We are currently 
looking  at  this  within  the  Economic  and  Social  Committee.  When  the 
decision-making centre lies outside a country's democratic system then the 
effectiveness of that democracy is  reduced, and workers no longer have any 
influence in  industrial situations which are their primary concern. DISCUSSION  ETHICS  79 
Mr Herbig: 
I would like briefly to intervene in the controversy between Mr Stewart and 
Mr Sgaramella. It is  true that much of the scientific  information which  is 
brought into public debate and political discussion is either poorly or wrongly 
understood. I will give two examples: Firstly, there was the famous "murder 
chromosome" which was"  discovered" in the United States towards the end of 
the 1960's and which was quite simply used to discriminate against a specific 
minority.  Individuals  with  a  particular genetic  make-up  were  branded as 
potential criminals. No reference was  made to the scientific basis for such a 
theory, nor to the social causes of crime.  In  the second example a leading 
scientific publication in Germany,"  Die Umschau", carried a paper at the end 
of  1979  by  a  recognised  scientist.  The  article  dealt  with  the  hormone 
characteristics of young female rats. The author, in all seriousness, managed 
to conclude from this that there was possible biological evidence to show that 
women's liberation was  impossible! 
I mention these two appalling examples of how science can be poorly or 
wrongly  understood,  because,  with  the  growing  accumulation  of  hard 
scientific knowledge on the human genetic make-up, there is  a danger that 
those in positions of  power would be tempted to use this information to justify 
political policies directed against specific social minorities. 
M  r von der Decken: 
I fully  accept  Mr Schumann's point that scientists must always adopt a 
critical  approach  to  their  work.  That  is  a  fundamental  principle  in  any 
thinking society. But I must refute Mr Bonety's suggestion that scientists are 
unthinking  and  uncritical.  It  is  not  true  for  my  scientific  colleagues  in 
Germany, nor of those I have met from France. Secondly, we must once again 
try to get away from the illusion that there is any such thing as a technology 
with zero-risk. Thirdly, there is certainly a danger that new techniques may be 
misused or, as Mr Herbig has pointed out, that scientific information may be 
misinterpreted by the public and wrongly applied. It is not the scientist's role 
to try and prove that there is no danger. Rather, the risks should be presented 
fairly and squarely, so that the public can then decide whether the technology 
should be used or not. 
Mr Sapir: 
The  principle  of scientific  freedom  is  always  loudly  defended,  both 
generally and in  this debate. Yet,  in the present difficult economic climate, 
research budgets are being cut. This seriously curtails scientist's "freedom". 
Furthermore, in  the field  of biotechnology, the distinction between funda-
mental research in the universities and applied industrial R & Dis now almost 
totally obscured. Many researchers have left the universities to set up their 
own companies. The universities themselves are getting involved in industrial 
work.  They  are  even  registering  patents.  In  taking on  such contracts,  the 
universities  now  find  themselves  bound  to  industrial secrecy.  Finally,  the 
general  development  of new  technologies  in  energy,  microelectronics and ~0  ETHICS  DISCUSSION 
biotechnology, are closely linked to industrial adaptation and social change. 
They  will  surely  play a  key  role  in  our efforts  to  overcome  the  present 
economic crisis.  Can biotechnology then be divorced from economic and 
political considerations. On the contrary, the decisions are too important to 
be left to a select few. In the light of these factors, is it still realistic to talk of 
academic freedom'? 
Mr·Zoli: 
Mr  Schumann,  in  his  eloquent  and  erudite  address  has  provided  an 
important complement to yesterday's debate. Scientists seem to take offence 
when so-called "science-fiction" issues, such as the "looney with a balhtub". 
are brought into the debate. It  has been claimed that the idea of a terrorist-
inspired epidemic is absurd. But then, all war is absurd. Psychological control 
is absurd. So too is the idea oflooking at the chromosomal structure in order 
to decide whether an unborn child should get the chance to live.  All that is 
"science-ficlion". Yet it  is  not so far-fetched. 
There  is  also  the  positive  side.  Biotechnology  may  help  to  solve  the 
problems of world food shortages, poverty and energy. It is a tool which can 
be used for evil, or for good. 
But  no-o~e would contest its  third characteristic, namely, that it  is  an 
instrument of  power. This aspect is deeply worrying, especially when we look 
at  recent  technological  developments.  The conquest  of space  has  been  a 
conquest by the superpowers, mainly for political ends. Computer technology 
is  largely  in  the  hands  of multinationals.  The  nuclear  field  is  similarly 
dominated by governmental interests. What then is  going to happen in the 
case of ON A'?  Who will  decide whether the research results will  be made 
public'? Who will decide whether they should be used? That is  the central 
question. 
Mr Schumann.  Rapporteur: 
If we have to take sides in the debate between Jacob and Monod, I think 
Dr Mouton is quite right in saying that it should be for scientific rather than 
metaphysical reasons. Jacob made a distinction between the central nervous 
system and  the  cellular system,  simply  for  reasons of scientific  caution. 
Monod, on the other hand, wanted so much to believe in the unity of  the living 
world, that he resorted to the allosteric enzymes to go beyond the realm of 
pure scientific observation. That seems to me the central point. Professor 
Fiers quite rightly pointed out that the basic scientific work of both men is 
identical. It is only when they pass from observation to conjecture, that their 
views diverge. 
I am also grateful to Professor Fiers for pointing out that the moratorium 
proposed by Paul Berg in  1974 was to be limited in scope and in  time. As it 
turned out, there was no moratorium at all. DISCUSSION  ETHICS  81 
Professor Winkler referred to the unlikelihood of microbiology leading to 
the creation of new pathogens. I can only agree. The prospect has worried 
scientists from time to time. However, I think their central concern was really 
to know whether man would be able to handle the chemical controls of his 
own destiny. 
-Mr  Buringh  referred  to  democratic  involvement  in  research.  I  already 
quoted Monod's condemnation of  all totalitarian regimes and his statement 
that democratic freedom is  an essential precondition for genuine scientific 
research. Mr Buringh is also right, if he means that the democratic process is 
one which never ends. The fact that we belong to a small privileged group of 
nations enjoying democratic freedom  does not absolve  us  of the duty to 
defend that freedom. An ever larger number of  people must have an effective 
say on issues affecting their future. It cannot be left to a small minority which 
might be tempted to exploit technological know-how in  its own particular 
commercial interest. 
I particularly liked Professor Puglisi's phrase that there are elements of 
"flexibility" in the DNA heredity system. In using it, he implicitly supports 
Jacob against Monod. 
When Mr Stewart referred to George Orwell's"  Nineteen eighty-four" and 
Aldous Huxley's "Brave New  World" he intentionally mixed up the issue of 
science-fiction with that of the multinationals. They are two quite separate 
questions. 
Science-fiction,  here  I  am  also  replying  to  Mr Zoli,  has  an  extremely 
important soci~ll function in  that it  acts both as a warning and a stimulus. 
When a genius like Huxley, or a serious humorist like Orwell, describe the 
world as it might be or as it should not be, they exercise a salutory influence on 
government.  There  is  also  a  link  with  Mr  Buringh's  call  for  broader 
democratic involvement. While the average citizen is  not able to follow the 
development of science at academic level, he can easily read works such as 
those of Orwell and Huxley. In this way, he can come to grips with science. 
M r Bonety stressed the need for a continual questioning. He recalled the 
fact that the Economic and Social Committee has proposed a Community 
Nuclear Safety Code. There is no better area in which this type of  democratic 
control should operate. Between technocrats who may tend to play down 
problems and science-fiction supporters who may exaggerate them, there is a 
golden mean. It is  here the process of democratic control has an important 
role. 
Mr Herbig rightly pointed to the misuse of scientific information and the 
kind of "scientUic Me Carthyism" which emerged in the United States at the 
end of the 1960's of which the idea of  a··  murder chromosome" was an extreme 
example. ETHICS  DISCUSSION 
Professor von der Decken pointed out that there was always a risk.  In the 
recombinant ON A field, the concerns of 1974 have been superseded by  the 
prospect of positive benefits such as human growth hormone or interferon. 
But we must remember Professor Dausset's remark that genetic engineering 
itself may soon be outdated. I  fit one day becomes possible to introduce a gene 
directly  into  a  cell,  the  risk  that  man  will  be  programmed  by  men  will 
reemerge, without any use  being made of recombinant DNA. 
I have a particular interest in  Mr Sapir's question on  research  budgets. 
When I was minister, public R & D expenditure in France reached almost 2% 
of GNP  ..  It is  now under I%. Admittedly, the economic climate is different 
and much of the  work  is  now carried out by  industry.  Yet  if science  is  to 
progress it  must be preserved as an end in itself. This does not mean that the 
interests of a few privileged researchers should be favoured at the expense of 
the right of  all to benefit. At the same time we must defend pure science in the 
face  of economic pressures which  put greater emphasis on applied R &  D. PAPER  PUBLIC INFORMATIOI\ 
TOPIC  F:  PUBLIC INFORMATION 
Mr Herbig, 
Rapporteur: 
It should be stated first of all that science and technology do not exist in a 
vacuum. The contreversy about nuclear energy and the problems caused by 
microelectronics have made a considerable body of the general public aware 
of the social consequences of scientific and technological discoveries.  The 
implementation of  technological discoveries of  any significance is increasingly 
dependent  on  public  discussion  and  the  workings  of a  more  and  more 
democratic decision-making process.  Moreover, public criticism and resis-
tance  on  nuclear  issues  has  revealed  shortcomings  in  official  plans  on 
technical matters such as  waste disposal and estimates of future needs. 
In the case of the new genetic engineering techniques, it  was the scientific 
community  itself  which  first  pointed  out  the  possible  risks  involved  in 
recombining  DNA  in  vitro.  The  voluntary "moratorium"  of 1974  and the 
safety  guidelines  developed  afterwards for  research  were  without doubt a 
laudable first step. But during the ensuing public controversy those involved 
increasingly tried to block public criticism of self-policing by scientists and 
counter government measures. 
Moreover, focusing on the safety problems of research technology diverted 
attention  in  public  discussions  away  from  the  technical  possibilities  of 
applying  such  technology  and  the  problems  involved.  In  my  view,  such 
technical applications in industry, medicine and agriculture will be far more 
important in the medium and long term than the question of the dangers of 
infection resulting from genetic research. I feel that it is necessary right now to 
recognise these possibilities and problems and discuss them, in order to reach 
socially acceptable decisions concerning policy for research and technology. 
For today the foundations are being laid for developments which tomorrow 
will  present us  with situations which may well appear to be constraints. 
Genetic engineering techniques have led to a revolution in  the control of 
natural processes by science and technology.  Deliberate intervention in  the 
molecular  regulatory  processes  of the  living  cell,  and  indeed  of whole X4  PUBLIC INFORMATION  PAPER 
organisms, has proved to be the springboard into a  new era of biological 
technology.  But as well  as  having uses  which cannot be disputed, genetic 
engineering creates a whole host of social and political problems. The most 
important of these does  not arise from  the general ambivalence towards 
technology in itself, which seems almost to be one of the laws of nature, but 
from an ambivalence about the social goals and interests behind the decisions 
to be taken about how to put discoveries into effect. 
For the first time it will be possible to conduct a systematic investigation of 
the molecular structure of the human genome. It may be possible to shed 
some light on the molecular causes of  hereditary diseases, diagnose a growing 
number of such diseases at an early stage and prevent the birth of unhealthy 
children.  But at the same time, there is  a  danger that the knowledge being 
acquired about  inherent  human  characteristics  will  be  used  not  only for 
medical but also for social purposes. 
Past experiences about the social use of  biological and genetic data all point 
to  the same conclusion:  the demand for genetic labels,  with  which  social 
problems can  be shown to  be  biological  in  origin,  is  great. The "murder 
chromosome", the inherent intelligence quotient, the sickle cell characteristic, 
and the case of chemical workers predisposed to cancer are all examples of 
this. In each case the "genetic" label has served as a means for transferring the 
responsibility for some striking defect or social disadvantage from society or 
powerful institutions to the individual. The growing availability of  such labels 
will probably lead in the future to a conflict between people's aspirations for 
social equality and differences diagnosed as genetic in origin. Such a conflict 
must be decided in  favour of social equality. 
Genetic therapy should be developed to help cure illnesses which have been 
clearly identified as being hereditary. But this would be difficult in a  multi-
factor context, in  which not only medical but also social factors had helped 
bring on an illness. 
Binding directives or protective measures should be designed to protect 
helpless patients from hasty researchers. 
Suggestions like those made in West Germany by the well-known scientific 
journalist von Ditfurth, whereby people would be compensated for alleged 
genetic defects caused by medical care involving extensive genetic engineering 
work,  are  in  several  ways  problematical.  Firstly,  it  has so far  not  been 
established that medical and social care does have a dysgenic effect. Secondly, 
such suggestions ignore the really dysgenic effects on our civilization caused 
by the multitude of mutagenic and teratogenic substances with which we are 
in contact every day. Thirdly, they legitimize human genetic engineering on an 
extensive scale, which again could be strongly determined by social objectives. 
It is  not disputed that the prospects for genetic engineering in the field of 
general medicine and pharmacology are highly promising. But the dangers PAPER  PUBLIC INFORMATION  85 
involved  should  not  be  overlooked.  The  health  authorities,  the  medical 
profession, the drugs industry and a considerable part of basic biomedical 
research is  mainly concerned with developing cures for illnesses which to an 
increasing extent are due to environmental factors. The aim is not to prevent 
illness from occuring but to help people to live with the causes of illnesses. 
The extraordinary potential of  biomedical progress for innovation through 
genetic engineering is therefore, in all probability, being developed along the 
same lines  .. With the help of increasingly costly medical and pharmacological 
machinery, people are being tailored to fit into an increasingly hostile social 
and technical environment. But some sort of  counterweight should be created 
here by laying down clear priorities in the field of publicly financed research. 
The goal ought to be preventive medicine. 
In  the  western  industrialized  countries  a  powerful  movement  towards 
concentration is at present taking place in the field of  agricultural technology. 
Multinational  chemical  and  drug  groups  with  interests  in  agricultural 
chemicals are engaged in the large scale buying-up of seed-producing firms, 
which are mainly medium-sized. From now on such groups may be able to 
offer "under one roof' a  whole package of modern agricultural technology 
from seeds to weedkillers and pesticides. 
The increasingly complicated technology involved in the molecular and cell 
biological techniques used in plant breeding will strengthen this movement 
towards concentration  further.  A  few  agricultural  multinationals  will  be 
developing "modern" plant species on a  world scale and at the same time 
selling  the  chemicals  to  go  with  them,  which  will  further aggravate  the 
problems of an agricultural industry which is  already extremely unnatural 
and dependent on chemicals. What is  needed are economic and technical 
developments which lead to greater genetic variety in  plants, a  partial de-
industrialization of methods of cultivation and to less ecologically dubious 
forms of pest control. 
If the industrial countries want to contribute towards solving the nutritional 
problem in those regions which are regularly hit by famine by manipulating 
the genetic structure of  useful plants or their symbionts, there are lessons to be 
learnt from the so-called" Green Revolution". The problems cannot be solved 
by  an  agricultural  sector  which  is  expensive,  highly  mechanised  and 
dependent on chemicals, as is the case in the industrial countries. In the first 
place, such an agricultural set-up utilises only a minority of landowners and 
commercially-oriented big farmers, and not the mass of small farmers. The 
agricultural  technology  offered  to  the· Third  World  by  groups from  the 
western industrialized countries is  landowner-oriented. There is  therefore a 
need, as far as publicly financed research is  concerned, to lay down clear 
priorities  to  favour  "low  input"  agricultural  technology  geared  to  the 
requirements of small farmers. PUBLIC INJ-"ORMATION  DISCUSSION 
In  the  major industrialized countries there are  now  systematic  links  at 
several levels between basic research in  molecular biology on the one hand 
and public institutions and private firms on the other. These include private 
initiatives  from  researchers  who  market  their  research  findings  through 
private firms, partnerships between pub~c  research institutes and commercial 
firms,  and,  finally,  alliances  for  specific  projects  between  individual  re-
searchers  in  the  university  or  Max  Planck  institutes  in  line'  with  the 
requirements of the research ministry in  Bonn. The aim of such links is to get 
basic research findings applied rapidly in  industry. 
But  apart  from  the  short-term  advantages  which  they  provide  for 
individual  researchers,  industrial  firms  or  states,  such  links  are  highly 
questionable. The potential for innovation of industry. which is geared to the 
economic success of private firms.  tends.  in  essential areas. to  be  diverted 
away from what is socially and politically desirable. If the aim is to be healthy. 
then  the  emphasis  should  be  put  on  keeping  healthy  and  not  on selling 
medicines. If the aim is improved agricultural technology for famine-stricken 
areas, then techniques must be developed for people who are too poor to pay 
for them. 
Such opportunities are not taken up by the profit-oriented economy. Needs 
remain unsatisfied although it would be economically and technically possible 
to satisfy them. Publicly financed "fi'ee" research is the only tool in our society 
which can  recognize these  needs and come up  with  solutions for satisfying 
them. For this reason its independence from economic interests ought to be 
guaranteed. 
A  whole  host  of leading  industrial  countries.  including  the  European 
Community, have initiated investigations into the possibilities of biological 
research and technology. With the exception of the outstanding (apart from 
some debatable points) study of  Gros. Jacob and Royer entitled"  Sciences de 
Ia  Vie  et Societe" (The Life Sciences and Society) such surveys are obsessed 
with  what  is  technically  feasible.  But  the  real  need  is  to  consider  the 
development of biological science and technology from the point of view·of 
social an political necessities, in order to establish reference points for political 
objectives for practically oriented research and technical development. 
DISCUSSION 
The Chairman.  Mrs  Heuser: 
I would like both the scientists and those involved in public information to 
address  themselves  very  specifically  to  the  topic  under  discussion.  What 
arrangements  do  we  need  to  facilitate  public  understanding,  to  remove 
mistrust,  or alternatively  to  arouse  a  questioning  attitude,  where  this  is 
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Mr de  Rosnay: 
I recognise the need for a constructive dialogue between scientists and the 
general public; but the difficulty here is that the public is not a homogenous 
mass, so any dialogue has to be on several levels: with young people still being 
trained, with people who wish to know about a new culture resulting from 
large-scale technology, with the media, with leaders of public life and the 
industrial world, and with scientists in other disciplines. Such an approach is 
valid both for genetic engineering and biology in general. 
For each of these groups, information must be transmitted differently. To 
quote Me Luhan, there are"  media" and"  messages"; the latter differ for each 
social group, which makes communication difficult. 
Another  important  point  is  that  the  general  public  usually  receives 
information  in  fits  and starts, whereas scientific  research is  a  continuous 
process. In a way the journalist, who is always "in too much of  a hurry". and 
the scientist, who is always considered as being "too cautious", are opposing 
forces.  The media send out "flashes"  of information which chop the real 
world of scientific development into slices. 
Scientific discovery is then no longer situated in its general context, and the 
hasty and fragmentary provision of  information makes the layman feel afraid, 
threatened, in danger. 
What is  more, the  most interesting aspects of such discoveries are not 
mentioned at all.  For instance, no-one says that genetic engineering is  a 
powerful tool for basic research thanks to the purification of genes and the 
study of the expression of such genes. One might also mention the role of 
gene-synthesising machines (for today it  is  possible to synthesise I 2 nucleo-
tides attached to each other in 6 hours) or protein analysers (  40 amino acids in 
a day, and soon 100 to 150 using only very small quantities of substance). 
Once again the ne~sflash will speak of a "gene-synthesising machine" but 
will  not explain its relationship to genetic engineering. 
So how are we to put across the idea of continuous progression? Well, we 
have to provide keys, a compass and a  map, and show the significance of a 
discovery and the meaning of its impact on society. PUBLIC INFORMATION  DISCUSSION 
One new topic which is currently attracting particular interest in university 
circles  is  "Science,  Technology  and Society"  (STS),  which  enables  one  to 
identify a  few  broad channels for improving communication between the 
scientist and the general public. 
This process of transfer is  based on three factors. Firstly, one must know 
what one is talking about. This is all to do with mass education. The thing is to 
help  people  to  understand  and  find  a  language  which  enables  others  to 
understand. 
Secondly, one must situate an event within its context. One must adopt a 
systemic  approach  as  a  back-up  to  the  analytical  approach  which  has 
traditionally been the foundation of our education system. 
Thirdly, and this aspect is important, the public must be given the means of 
assessing the implications of these branches of science and technology for 
society from the individual, social, economic or even philosophical point of 
view. 
Finally, the journalist must learn to project himself into the future, not to 
alarm people but to describe what might  happen.  Fie  must  therefore not 
overlook any of  the implications of  a discovery and paint a picture afwhat the 
future might be like. 
Projecting oneself into the future is also the means, starting in the present, 
of regaining the sense of a process and of passing from the discontinuous to 
the continuous. One can also create a basis for a dialogue between scientists, 
the public and decision-makers. 
Mrs  Fuks: 
There are several reasons why we have to respond to the preoccupations of 
public opinion. Two of these have already been mentioned.  Firstly, infor-
mation is needed on technical risks. The second involves the so-called "social 
risks" i.e. the possibility that the technology would be misused by a particular 
group or government. There is  also a  third  reason. The  level  of general 
education in the industrially developed countries is far higher than in the past. 
There is access to mass media and new information technologies. There is a 
need to inform but equally a need to take account of the citizen's view. The 
public must have the feeling of actually being involved in the development of 
science. Efforts to adopt a new approach in scientific journalism are therefore 
welcome. 
Clearly, the way in which science is  organized is  changing. In the field of 
biology, the distinction between fundamental and applied R & 0  is no longer 
clear-cut. There is therefore also a need for more information on the decision-
making process, from the initial idea to the final application. We should also 
look at these structures in order to find the most appropriate way of keeping 
the  public properly informed.  It  is  not sufficient merely  to  provide infor-DISCUSSION  PUBLIC INFORMATION  89 
mati'on. Some sense of imagination must also be shown in the institutional 
field to encourage groups representing the general public to get informed and 
be involved in decision-making. 
Mr von der Decken: 
In providing public information, what level of detail is  required? Where 
there is  a  dialogue, the level  is  automatically regulated.  But this feedback 
doesn't exist  in  a  straight information process.  If the information is  too 
detailed for the current level of knowledge of those for whom it is intended, 
then the objective of providing greater clarity will certainly not be achieved. If 
too little information is provided, a climate of mistrust can very easily spring 
up. Our society is so complex, that it is impossible for an individual, and that 
includes scientists, to follow technological developments in every field down 
to the last detail. Together, the public, scientific journalists and scientists have 
to try and strike the right level. 
Mr Mouton: 
Scientists themselves have an important role to play in public information. 
It is  not enough for them just to publish the results of their research. They 
must also be responsible as human beings. We have seen what can happen. 
Oppenheimer, who invented the A bomb, refused to make the H bomb. Then 
Teller said he wasn't responsible for the A bomb, so it was all right for him to 
make the H bomb. Again, the scientists believed that the atomic bomb was to 
be demonstrated to Japanese observers in a desert. Instead it was dropped on 
Hiroshima. Scientists are responsible, like the rest of us. They are people with 
religious beliefs and ethical values. They have the responsibility to bring issues 
to the attention of the public authorities and the general public. 
In providing information to the public, scientists must be able to explain 
things in simple terms. I fully agree with Mr de Rosnay on this point. His book 
"From !he A tom to the Cell" is a good example of how a message can be put 
across in simple language. There is also a need to teach biology in schools at 
an earlier stage. It must not simply be descriptive. Children should be able to 
get a  broad understanding of what constitutes life.  While the prospect is 
somewhat frightening, we have now reached the stage where we have to make 
advances in the ethical side which match our power over nature. If not, we will 
wipe ourselves out. Other civilizations before us have vanished, though we 
don't really know why. 
Scientists can  help by joining discussion groups and also by  providing 
back-up for the scientific journalists. Once they have made a discovery, they 
should also devote part of their time to public information. It may not prevent 
knowledge being used for'evil purposes, but it will certainly help to create a 
positive climate of debate. 
Mr Stewart: 
We have been asked how we can allay public suspicion of new technology. 
We will never succeed so long as we look on it as a one-way-process from the 90  PUBLIC INFORMATION  DISCUSSION 
scientist, through the journalist, to the public. The public must be  able to 
participate actively and feel  that it  can get  the information required. The 
technical complexity of  the subject, however, creates an immediate difficulty. 
Here again, the experience of Cambridge, Massachusetts, provides a good 
example. The citizens on the Cambridge Review Board successfully came to 
terms with a complex subject, because they had at their disposal experts who 
disagreed among themselves. Had they been confronted by experts who all  · 
said the same thing, they would have been forced to passively accept it.  By 
questioning the different standpoints, confronting the experts and listening to 
their arguments, they were able to form a genuine independent opinion. As 
scientists therefore, we should not feel  it is  a bad thing to have inconclusive 
debates amongst ourselves. In fact it is our only hope. If we try to promulgate 
a single truth, using clever mass-media techniques, we  will never succeed in 
gaining public confidence. 
The  point  made  by  Joel  de  Rosnay  that  the  public  is  not  a  uniform 
phenomenon is  extremely important.  He specifically cited the example of 
industrialists. However, the relationship between scientists and industrialists 
is  not the same as that between scientists and the general public. In the first 
case, a natural two-way communication exists. In.the second, we have to look 
for a different model. The University of Amsterdam conducted a successful 
experiment  recently  in  setting  up  "Science  Shops".  In  this  system,  the 
scientists in  the university put themselves at the disposal of interest groups 
such as consumers and trade unions to answer questions they would like 
investigated.  We must develop this kind of active relationship hetween the 
scientific community and the public. 
Mrs  Lund: 
Scientists can be criticized for using artificial language and for often talking 
with  great  authority  in  areas  which  are  not  really  their  own.  In  such 
circumstances, it is understandable that the public gets confused and fears the 
worst. 
A greater effort should be made to present issues in such a way that there is 
worthwhile public discussion. It is  not a  waste of effort for scientists to 
communicate with the public.  Nor does one become a  better scientist by 
hiding behind difficult words. 
Mr Herbig, Rapporteur: 
The main criticism should not, I think, be levelled at scientific journalists 
and  the  media.  They  are  well  able  to  handle  technical  material  and 
communicate it to the public. Taking a cross-section of  the press in Germany 
and the United States, I would regard that problem as already largely solved. 
However, there is still the need, stressed by Mrs Fuks, to make the decision-
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Too often, we hear that genetic engineering will solve the problems of  world 
hunger, health, environment and energy. In the future, we should it make it 
clear that technological development is a very diverse process. Different social 
groups will be affected in different ways. It will also be necessary to involve the 
public in political debate at an earlier stage in the decision-making process. 
Here scientific journalism can contribute. ESC  CLOSING REMARKS  93 
CLOSING REMARKS 
The Chairman, Mrs Heuser: 
We have reached the end of our discussions. 
One question seems to remain. How much extra wisdom does information 
confer? Or, how much more certain am I  now, than at the opening of the 
debate? It is  a question which will be long debated. 
One thing, however, is evident. It is the burden that freedom entails. It  is the 
burden of having to take responsibility for decisions without guarantees as to 
their ultimate consequences. It is  true for both scientists and politicians. It 
applies to all of  us, and to every field of  activity. Man lives in a world, caught, 
as  Mr  Schumann  put  it,  between  the  most  noble  plans  and  the  basest 
intentions. 
1 
In this morning's debate, it was said that research should be an end in itself 
and should not be planned in relation to specific applications. I am not in a 
position here to judge that issue. It is so large, that it would require another 
colloquy, which might never end. 
Much  has  been said on the relationship between the scientists and the 
public. It has been claimed that mistrust between the two groups is a healthy 
phenomenon. But we must also remember that human relations within the 
community  must  be  based  on  trust.  In  that  regard,  each  of us  has  a 
responsibility. APPENDIX 
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Object of the Study 
In  April  1979  the Council asked the Committee for an Opinion on the 
Proposal  for  a  Council  Directive  establishing  Safety  Measures  against 
Conjectural Risks associated with Recombinant DNA Work. 
This Opinion was delivered in July 1979C). The Committee unanimously 
endorsed  the  issuing  of  a  Directive,  but  had  considerable  reservations 
concerning the assessment of the probability, extent and frequency of the 
suspected hazards.  · 
The Committee also thought that there was as yet too little information on 
the specific technical and biological safety measures and their effectiveness 
vis-a-vis the suspected hazards. 
In general, the Committee considered the genetic engineering information 
on which the proposal for a  Directive was based to be behind the state of 
knowledge obtaining at the time the proposal was submitted. 
In order to take account of  all factors, and neither unduly impede research 
and  utilization  nor  neglect  the  protection of Member State citizens,  the 
Committee  decided  to  draw  up  a  Study  dealing  in  particular  with  the 
problems set out in  points 2.9. and 2.10. of its 1979 Opinion. 
On this basis, a hearing was to be held-j.ointly with the Commission-
in order to gather the views of experts from the world of  science, health care, 
farming, industry and the trade unions and of representatives of the public 
interest. 
The  Committee started  its  preparatory  work  immediately so  that  the 
findings of this Study and the hearing could be presented while the decision-
making concerning the proposed Directive was still in progress. 
During this preliminary work, the Commission's Draft Council Recom-
mendation concerning the Registration of Recombinant DNA (Deoxyribo-
nucleic  Acid)  Work was  drawn up.  It was  referred to the Committee on 
26 September 1980. 
Even if many of the suggestions in the ESC Opinion on the Proposal for a 
Council  Directive establishing Safety Measures Against Conjectural Risks 
Associated  with  Recombinant  DNA  Work  were  taken  up  in  the  new 
recommendations, the present Study has not become superfluous. Genetic 
engineering methods have raised many questions which are still unanswered. 
The  problems  will  not  be  solved  merely  through  a  pragmatic 
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adaptation of the safety measures or measures concerning the registration of 
genetic engineering work laid down by the authorities. 
The authors of this  Study  have  tried  to  put  across  difficult  scientific 
concepts in such a way that they will be comprehensible to the layman, as they 
consider it  essential  that  the  citizens of the  Community  should  have  an 
understanding of this area of research which is so promising but difficult to 
'delimit, with its implications for man and his environment. 
Definitions 
Recombination of DNA 
The coupling of ON  A molecules outside a living organism to form a new 
molecule not occuring in nature and the introduction of this new molecule 
into  a  host  organism,  where  it  is  reproduced  and  passed  on  to  future 
generations of the host organism. 
1.  Host  organism:  an  organism  into  which  a  recombinant  DNA  is 
introduced. 
2.  Donor ol'ganism:  an  organism  whose  DNA,  or parts  thereof,  are 
coupled with the vector and then introduced into the host organism. 
This ON  A can be isolated from the donor or produced synthetically. 
3.  Vectors:  DNA  molecules  capable  of  multiplying  (e.g.  plasmids, 
viruses) which are coupled with donor DNA and introduced into the 
host organism. 
Genetic engineering risks 
Any work on the production, introduction and reproduction of recom-
binant  DNA, including any work  with  host organisms containing recom-
binant DNA. 
Genetic Engineering risks 
Any  special  risks  which  might  arise  with,  or  through  working  with, 
recombinant ON  A or organisms containing recombinant ON  A. 
Safety measures 
Any measures capable of reducing or precluding genetic engineering risks 
or designed for that purpose. 
Historical Background 
Modern genetic engineering methods represent an application of modern 
genetic and enzymological knowledge, gained from quite unrelated processes. ESC  APPENDIX  99 
Modern genetics has shown that all genetic information is  contained in 
thread-shaped molecules known as nucleic acids ( 1944  ). The discovery of the 
structure of the nucleic acids ( 1953) and the deciphering of the code in which 
genetic information is  transferred in  DNA ( 1961-1965) were revolutionary 
discoveries in modern biology. At the same time, it was learnt how to isolate 
nucleic acids as functioning molecules and reintroduce them into organisms. 
At the same time,  modern  molecular biology succeeded in  discovering 
many of the enzymes involved in numerous important life processes and the 
way in which they operated. Thus, enzymes were discovered which propagated 
nucleic  acids,  repaired  nucleic  acids  which  were  damaged  and  attached 
broken pieces of DNA together again (1956 and later). 
Genetic  and  biochemical  studies  led  to  the  isolation  of the  so-called 
"restriction  enzymes",  which  cut  DNA  only  in  certain  places  in  a  pre-
determined sequence ( 1965). 
With  the  help  of these  restriction  enzymes,  it  is  possible  to  cut  DNA 
molecules, which are very long, into specific pieces, separate them from each 
other and link them up with isolated pieces of DNA of a different origin by 
using enzymes. Under certain conditions, one can obtain DNA molecules 
which can operate after re-insertion into another organism, i.e. their genetic 
information is  read by the host organism as if it were its own, utilized and 
transmitted to succeeding generations. 
This  practical  application  of new  genetic,  biochemical  and  molecular 
biological knowledge was neither intentional nor foreseeable.  When it was 
suddenly realized at the beginning of the 1970s what extraordinary possibi-
lities were opening up, scientists and informed members of the public alike 
were taken by surprise. As a  result, genetic engineering was considered by 
some sectors of  popular opinion as a great breakthrough and condemned as a 
lethal threat by others. 
Initial  experiments  with  the  new  technology  and  intensive  discussions 
within the world of  science and between scientists and members of the public 
have  reduced  both expectations and fears  to a  reasonable  level.  Genetic 
engineering promises many new discoveries and may help solve many medical 
and biological problems; initial applications are already being made in  the 
medical and industrial fields. 
There is  more awareness of the safety issues involved and many largely 
practical proposals to increase safety are being made. 
Possibilities of Genetic Engineering 
The scientific, social and economic importance of  the new technology lies in 
the possibilities it offers for the following: 100  APPENDIX  ESC 
I.  Obtaining specific sections of DNA in  practically unlimited quantities. 
This is an important prerequisite for investigations into the microstructure 
of DNA. Modern biochemical methods make it possible to determine the 
sequence of nucleotides in DNA and thus_read their genetic information. 
But  this  is  only  possible  when  specific  pieces  are  available  in  large 
quantities. Thus, for example, in  1979 the microstructure of the DNA of 
the hepatitis B virus was worked out with the help of genetic engineering. 
As  there  is  no  way  of propagating  this  virus  in  a  culture,  genetic 
engineering methods were the only way in which sufficient quantities of 
the virus's DNA could be obtained. Such work is  an important step in 
developing a vaccine against this dangerous illness. 
2.  Understanding cell differentiation and the regulation of  genetic expression, 
particularly in  higher life forms. 
The fact that all the cells of a multi-celled organism, such as man, contain 
the same genetic information poses a largely unanswered question about 
how such information is  utilized in a  regular and orderly manner. 
This plays a part in embryo development, when it is established which cell 
will become a skin cell and from which cell a blood cell be produced (cell 
differentiation). 
In  developed organisms,  steps  must  be taken to ensure that only the 
genetic information related to the cell's function is  used (regulation of 
genetic  expression).  Disturbances  in  cell  differentiation  and  genetic 
regulation can lead to serious illnesses, such as cancer. 
Genetic  engineering  makes  it  possible  to  investigate  the  structure  of 
specific nucleic acids in  an individual organism and compare them with 
similar  DNA  segments  in  related  organisms.  At  the  end  of  such 
investigations one has an exact chart of  all genetic information, which then 
makes it possible to identify the structures responsible for differentiation 
and regulation. 
3.  Deliberate  transfer of specific  hereditary  information, and  making it 
function in foreign organisms. 
This is the possibility which from the beginning has caused both the hopes 
and the fears.  It  is  here that the information content of specific nucleic 
acids can be directly examined and it  is  here too that the economically 
interesting possibilities of  applying genetic engineering lie. It is foreseeable 
that  in  this  way  therapeutically  important  products  can  be  produced 
cheaply in  easily propagated bacteria, e.g.  pituitary hormones, antigens 
for vaccines or interferon. 
4.  A  completely different application is  the transfer of genes for specific 
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but which  may be of great importance for such organisms. Thus, the 
introduction into plants of  genes which make it possible to utilize nitrogen 
from the air would make such plants largely independent of fertilizers. 
Through the deliberate recombination of  genes for specific characteristics 
one could produce, circumstances permitting, micro-organisms which, for 
example,  attacked  plastic or "digested"  oil,  which  could  be  of great 
importance t~ keeping our environment clean. 
Risks of Genetic ·Engineering 
Genetic engineering makes it possible to combine genetic information from 
different sources into new viable units. In this way the genetic information of 
an organism can be expanded either at random or for a specific purpose. Host 
organisms can thus acquire new capabilities or characteristics. If these are 
characteristics  that  turp  harmless  organisms  into  pathogens  or  cause 
undesirable changes in our environment through whatever mechanism, then 
man and  his  environment can  be endangered if organisms escape to the 
environment. 
These factors led in 1973/74 to voluntary restrictions in the application of 
this technology by scientists and to the issue of national rules for recombinant 
DNA work. It must be pointed out here that these risks or dangers are only 
conjectural.  All  genetic  engineering experiments  carried  out so  far,  and 
specific tests to assess the hazards, have failed to provide any evidence that 
these conjectural risks do in fact exist. 
A  formal  analysis  of  the  hypothetical  risk  indicates  that  genetically 
manipulated organisms will present a hazard only if the following conditions 
are met: 
I.  The host organism receives new genetic material; in all genetic engineering 
experiments, new genetic information is introduced into only a fraction of 
the host organism used.  ' 
2.  The genetically manipulated organism escapes despite the experimenter's 
safety precautions.  Long experience in  working with highly pathogenic 
micro-organisms  has  shown  that  pathogens  can  be  multiplied  and 
· examine'd without any danger to scientists or the environment. 
3.  A genetically manipulated organism that escapes must be able to: 
a)  survive 
b)  multiply, and 
c)  interact with the living development 
indefinitely outside the laboratory or place of production. 
Whereas animal cells, which are also suitable as host organisms, can continue 
continue  to  live  and  multiply  only  under  very  complex and stringent 
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bacteria, yeasts and algae, can survive and reproduce under conditions 
that are not tightly controlled. This applie.s in particular to organisms that 
have recently  been taken from  their natural habitat and have not yet 
adjusted to artificial laboratory conditions. 
But even the lower organisms have certain requirements, such as suitable 
temperatures, humidity, nutrients, etc., that must be met if they are to 
multiply. 
In  the  case  of some  organisms,  such  as  Escherichia  {o/i,  a  normal 
inhabitant of  the gut, the experimenter himself can form a suitable habitat 
and is  thus particularly at risk. 
If bacterial or animal viruses are used as recombinant DNA vectors, they 
must find a suitable host cell if they are to survive. 
The extent  to  which  organisms  that  have  escaped  will  be  capable of 
interacting with their environment depends on many special factors in the 
ecosystem. The probability of  a genetically manipulated organism finding 
a  suitable  environment  is  in  almost  all  cases  extremely  small.  This 
particularly applies to weakened host organisms.  With an appropriate 
choice of host organisms this probability can become close to zero. 
4.  If  an  organism  established  in  the  environment  escapes  after  being 
genetically  manipulated,  it  can  become  a  hazard  if  the  new  DNA 
introduced imparts new harmful properties to it. 
Harmful properties include: Synthesis of harmful substances (e.g. tetanus 
toxin) by bacteria, acquisition of a particularly high growth potential in 
the case of  weeds, and the ability to pass on foreign, potentially dangerous 
nucleic acids to the actual target cell (e.g. tumor viruses). 
Only if all the above conditions are fulfilled can the conjectural dangers 
become a reality. The actual probability of this happening is  ~qual to the 
product of the probabilities of conditions l  to 4. 
If we  confine ourselves to  the  risk  of genetic manipulation turning a 
harmless micro-organism into a microbe producing a dangerous infection, 
then the following requirements can be added to the above conditions: 
a)  Survival  and  reproduction  must  take  place  in  such  a  way  that 
transmission is  possible from animal to animal or from one human 
being to another: 
b)  The microbe must have the ability to penetrate the skin or the mucous 
membranes and must be resistant to the natural defence mechanisms, 
such as interferon: 
c)  The microbe must be able to multiply and spread in the infected host; 
d)  The microbe  must be able to produce a  toxin or harm the host in 
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All  these preconditions  must  be  met simultaneously for the danger to 
materialize. 
This formal analysis of  the risk involved not only explains the probability of 
something dangerous occurring but also gives some pointers as to what safety 
measures are suitable for reducing or removing altogether the risks to man 
and the environment posed by genetic engineering experiments or the use of 
genetically adapted organisms. 
Assessment of the Risk 
The conceivable or conjectural risks of genetic engineering range from a 
danger to tne expenmenter or other parties to a lite-threatening change in the 
environment. 
On the basis of an analysis of special experiments to assess the risks and a 
re-evaluation of longstanding experience and knowledge, the actual risks are 
today considered to be very slight. 
While  it  was  initially  assumed  that  practically all  DNA  introduced  at 
random by genetic engineering would lead to a change in the characteristics of 
the host organism, the numerous genetic engineering experiments carried out 
so far have shown that this in fact happens in very few cases only. 
Part of the genetic information of all organisms is  a complicated control 
system, into which the foreign DNA must be fitted very carefully if it is to be 
effective. This means that the experimenter can in  many cases predict when 
the host organism can be expected to acquire new properties. 
Particular concern was felt  previously about the transfer of DNA from 
animal cells to lower organisms. There were fears about the uncontrolled 
introduction of genetic codes for malignant degeneration or highly active 
hormones, for example, into lower organisms, which could then lead to the 
formation of tumours or hormonal disorders in humans. It was subsequently 
discovered that the genetic information of higher organisms is not present in 
one continuous piece but is divided into many sections with gaps in between. 
Before such fragmented information is utilized it must be joined together in a 
complicated  process.  This  structure of the genome  makes  the  accidental 
transfer of potentially dangerous genetic information practically impossible, 
especially as bacteria are not in a position to process the genetic information 
contained in  the sections. 
Obviously, there was also a fear that the introduction of  genetic information 
from  pathogens or poison-producing plants and animals could give  host 
organisms new, pathogenic characteristics. Accordingly, all such experiments 
have, from the outset, only been conducted using special safety precautions. 
Investigations into the factors which determine the pathogenic qualities of 
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present at the same time if such organisms are to become a danger. As it is 
improbable that all the necessary factors are acquired at the same time by the 
host organism in a single genetic engineering experiment, the risk of such an 
event occurring is considered to be relatively small. But if one is still advised to 
be careful here, it  is  because our knowledge of the process through which 
micro-organisms cause illness is  still very incomplete. 
A distinction must be made between the uncontrolled risk of transferring 
random genetic information ("shotgun experiment") and the risks that can 
arise with the selective introduction of  characteristic genetic information into 
host organisms. In many cases the risk here can be very accurately assessed or 
specific tests can be carried out to evaluate it. Suitable safe precautions can 
then be taken to counter the special hazards. 
There has been no shortage of attempts to classify the possible risks which 
may be involved in working with organisms containing recombinant DNA. 
The aim of such attempts is  to correlate certain risks with certain safety 
measures.  Unfortunately,  none of the sugge\ted classification systems has 
completely solved the problems involved because many of the parameters 
necessary can only be specified approximately. Very soon it will be possible to 
apply the verifiable and tested rules of medical microbiology. 
In the Member States, either the classification ofthe USA's NIH or the UK 
was taken over or separate national guidelines were drawn up (as in  West 
Germany, for instance). Common to all the various guidelines is the fact that 
work with pathogenic micro-organisms, the genes of poisons or highly active 
proteins (e.g. hormones) is  considered to be particularly hazardous. 
In  1979,  a  WHO working party proposed a  classification of pathogens 
which could also be applied in  genetic engineering. This is  possible if one 
assumes that organisms with recombinant DNA pose dangers similar to-
but  not greater than - those posed by  known  pathogens.  In  the WHO 
classification, known pathogens are divided into four risk groups. 
Risk  Group  1:  Low  risk for individuals and  the general public 
Organisms which as  a  rule do  not cause  illnesses  in  human beings or 
animals. To this group belong the much-used host organisms E.  coli (normally 
found in the intestine) 9r B.  subtilis (a common germ found in the soil). 
Risk Group II:  Moderate risk for individuals, limited risk for the general public. 
An organism which causes illnesses  in  human beings and animals but 
which, as a  rule, does not represent a serious danger for those working in 
laboratories, the general public, the animal world or the ecosystem. Contact 
with such organisms in the laboratory leads only rarely to serious infections: 
effective preventive measures and  medicines are available and the  risk  of 
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Risk  Group  Ill: High risk for individuals,  low  risk  for the  gen~ratpublic 
An organism which usually causes serious diseases but which, as a rule, is 
not transferred by an infected person to others. 
Risk  Group  IV:  High risk for individuals and  the general public 
An organism which, as a rule, causes serious diseases in human beings and 
animals and which can be easily transferred directly or indirectly. 
This classification system considers the following criteria as important in 
determining to which risk group a pathogen should belong: 
the frequency that a pathogen causes an illness: 
- how dangerous the disease is, and 
- the probability of the disease being transferred. 
Thus the rubella virus, for example, which as a rule does not cause a serious 
disease, which represents a  danger only for pregnant women who have no 
immunity and for which an effective vaccine is available would belong to Risk 
Group II. 
The rabies virus, which always causes deadly infections but which is  not 
transferred from one human being to another, would go in Risk Group Ill. 
Germs which cause hemorrhagic fevers (e.g. Lassa or Ebola virus) or the 
smallpox virus would belong to Risk Group IV. 
Genetic engineering work will  generally fit  very neatly into this scheme. 
Experiments using weakened host organisms (safe strains) which are highly 
unlikely to be capable of reproducing themselves outside a  laboratory will 
normally be put in Group I,  and rarely in  Group I I. 
Genetic engineering work which has the purpose of  producing highly active 
proteins (e.g. hormones) is  classified according to the suspected risk of an 
infection being produced by the resulting host organisms, as established on 
the basis of medical experience. 
.  .. 
In genetic engineering work with pathogens, e.g. with the aim of making a 
vaccine, experiments should first be assigned to the same Risk Group as the 
pathogen  involved.  Reclassification  is  always  possible  in  the  light  of 
experience. 
Safety Measur~s 
Although the possible hazards of  genetic engineering are today considered 
to be very slight, they cannot, however, be completely ruled out. This means 
that suitable safety precautions must be taken to deal with the conjectural 
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Genetic  engineering  safety  precautions  must  above  all  be  aimed  at 
preventing the escape of  a host organism and/or making it impossible for the 
host organism to become established in the environment. This is achieved by: 
I.  Observing "good microbiological practice": 
2.  Applying special physical safety precautions; 
3.  Using weakened host organisms that can only multiply under controlled 
conditions (biological safety precautions). 
Ad  1 
Strict application of proven techniques for working with micro-organisms, 
particularly pathogens, is  the most important safety  precaution of all.  Its 
effectiveness is underlined by the fact that work on pathogens has been going 
on for over 100 years without any major chains of infection having started in 
the laboratories in question. Any occasional infections of the persons working 
directly with the microbes has always been due to non-observance of "good 
microbiological practice". 
This includes above all a strict ban on pipetting by mouth and on eating, 
drinking and smoking in  the laboratory: the hands s.hould also be  washed 
thoroughly before leaving the laboratory. 
Sound training in "good microbiological practice" must be given to all staff 
before they start genetic engineering work, and this training must be repeated 
at regular intervals. As part of  this training, staff must be instructed how to act 
in emergencies. 
All persons engaged in genetic engineering must be familiar with deconta-
mination and disinfection techniques. 
Ad  2 
Operations whereby aerosols containing micro-organisms occur can  be 
carried out without any particular risk in special safety cabinets (Class I, II and 
Ill). The negative air pressure in these safety cabinets ensures that microbes-
cannot get out. Filters impermeable to bacteria prevent the organisms from 
escaping  with  the  flow  of air.  Any  desired  containment  of the  micro-
organisms can be achieved with appropriate set-ups. Use of these facilities 
does,  however,  mean  considerable  constraints  in  the  performance of the 
experiments. 
If these safety cabinets are used in  specially designed safety laboratories 
under  negative  air  pressure  and  with  outlet  air  filters,  it  is  practically 
impossible for genetically manipulated organisms to escape, provided "good 
microbiological practice" is  constantly observed. 
Ad 3 
If  genetically manipulated micro-organisms or vectors are to form a hazard 
they  must be  able  to  establish  themselves  in  their  normal  environment. 
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therefore proposed that in genetic engineering work, use should be made only 
of hosts and vectors with defects, so that they are able to live and multiply only 
under artificial conditions. 
Animal cells in cultures are therefore ideal hosts. Similar suitable hosts have 
been  produced by  introducing certain  mutations in  micro-organisms that 
have  been  well  investigated.  Mention  can  be  made  here  of strains  of 
Escherichia coli,  Bacillus subtilis.  Streptomyces cre/icolor and Sacharomyces 
cerevisiae. 
All these "safe" strains are defective in one or more properties essential for 
survival under natural conditions. 
Constant checks must be made to ensure that it is in fact these"  safe" strains 
that are being worked with. This is  to prevent non-weakened strains from 
being contaminated and overgrown with wild strains. 
Health Protection 
The  persons  coming into  closest  contact  with  genetically  manipulated 
organisms are  those engaged in  genetic engineering work.  It is  therefore 
reasonable to assume that these are the persons most likely to be at risk. 
Persons who are especially at risk, such as pregnant women, persons with 
diseases of the immune system and persons undergoing cytostatic treatment, 
should be excluded from genetic engineering work that could put them in 
danger. For this reason, a  careful examination when staff are recruited or 
when  genetic  engineering  work  is  begun  is  of great  importance.  Serum 
samples should be taken and kept for comparison in later tests. Permanent, 
specifically  directed  health  supervision  is  an  important  measure  here  for 
averting risks and detecting special hazards. 
Selective  investigation of certain  medical  parameters, such as antibody 
count or resistance to antibiotics of the natural flora can indicate whether a 
dangerous event has taken place. In this way health supervision can help to 
check the effectiveness of the safety precautions. 
State Monitoring of Genetic Engineering 
The introduction of  this technology sparked off  a debate on whether it is the 
State's job and/or duty to regulate and monitor genetic engineering. 
Almost all countries promoting research have issued rules for work with 
recombinant  ON A.  Some countries  have  so  extended  existing epidemics 
legislation that genetic engineering is  also covered. 
The  most  important  elements  in  the  rules  are  registration  of genetic 
engineering work, restriction to selected host organisms and vectors and the 
designation of special safety precautions for certain conjectural risks. 108  APPENDIX  ESC 
As more and more experience has been gained with genetic engineering, the 
restrictions imposed by the rules have been eased. Some countries think that 
registration  is  enough,  but  others  continue  to  engage  in  very  extensive 
monitoring of these experiments. At all events it will not be possible in the 
foreseeable future to dispense with State licensing in  the area of biological 
safety  precautions,  i.e.  the  use  of selected  hosts  and  vectors.  The strict 
observance of biological safety precautions has made a decisive contribution 
towards  ensuring  that  the  initial  fears  about  the  dangers  of  the  new 
technology  have  so  far  not  become  reality.  Because of the  great,  indeed 
decisive,  importance of biological  safety  precautions,  the  choice  of them 
cannot be left to individual researchers. 
Final Comments and Open Questions 
The  debate  on  the  uses  and  risks  of genetic  engineering  has  many 
peculiarities and despite the great intensity with which it has been conducted, 
many questions have been left open. 
It is worth noting that it was the scientists concerned themselves who drew 
attention to the possible dangers of the new technology in open letters ( 1973, 
1974 ). They called upon the relevant national authorities to lay down guiding 
principles for work with organisms containing recombinant DNA. Until then, 
the nature and extent of experiments were to be regulated through voluntary 
restraint. 
The national authorities have tackled the problems involved with noticeable 
rapidity and thoroughness, and it is clear how attitudes towards science have 
changed. Instead of an almost unbridled enthusiasm for all things scientific, 
there is  now a widespread attitude of almost instinctive scepticism towards 
any new scientific development. Any critical assessment of  the state of  genetic 
engineering must take into account this changed attitude towards science on 
the part of the public. Scientists themselves consider the new technology to be 
highly important. Many hitherto insoluble problems can be tackled. Con-
sequently,  we  are  now  finding  more  and  more  applications  for  genetic 
engineering techniques. 
The  reactions  of  the  public  have  varied  enormously.  Some  highly 
motivated groups have thrown themselves into the debate intensively and 
aggressively, while others have simply become confirmed in their mistrust of 
science. The new discoveries and methods have not always been adequately 
represented in the press. Exaggerated reports of the commercial usefulness of 
genetic engineering have particularly aroused public mistrust. Many fear that 
safety measures necessary to protect the public are being sacrified for the 
benefit of supposed economic interests. 
While the problen\s of genetic engineering were first intensively discussed 
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medical microbiologists, population geneticists, ecologists, infection experts 
and other scientists have been drawn into the discussion. This has proved 
extremely  fruitful  for  all  the  scientists  involved.  A  new,  more  realistic 
assessment of the  risks  would  not  have  been  possible  without such  wide-
ranging cooperation. 
But despite these efforts many questions remain open, as  the discussion 
about  the  Council  Directive  has  shown.  Many  questions  must  remain 
unanswered because none of the experiments necessary to finding an answer 
have  yet  been  performed. Other, perhaps important questions have  been 
asked because the full range of possibilities for applying the new technology is 
not yet known. Where possible, a decisive attempt should be made to discuss 
the problems involved without prejudice in a dialogue between scientists and 
the general public and find conclusive solutions. 
Among the questions which are still open or which have not been explained 
adequately are the following: 
Are the risks of genetic engineering being assessed realistically today by 
scientists'? 
Are the risks of genetic engineering balanced by its uses'? 
Should  further  investigations  into  the  risks  of  genetic  engineering 
experiments be carried out? 
Are we monitoring the field of application of the new technology so well 
that we can take account of all  possible risks'? 
Is it  possible to draw up a reliable classification of the risks and use it to 
classify safety measures? 
Are supervisory measures indicated to ensure that only weakened host 
organisms and the corresponding vectors are used in genetic engineering 
· work? 
Should all  genetic engineering experiments be  notified and registered or 
not? 
Must certain experiments be  made dependent on prior authorization by 
the state authorities? 
Do genetic engineers receive adequate basic and further training on safety 
technil]Ues'? 
Is  it  possible  and  recommendable  to  codify  "good  microhiological 
practice'"? 
Are  the  physical  safety  measures  currently  being  practised  adequate, 
inadequate or exaggerated? 
Must  the  use  of only  specially  weakened  organisms  (safe  strains)  be 
maintained'? 
Does the commercial use of this technology involve particular risks'? 
Is  the commercial use  of this  technology helped or hindered by  having 
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When should the State step in to protect the general public? 
What measures can the State take to make full use of  genetic engineering 
techniques? 
What steps can be taken to ensure that this new technology does not 
encourage  new  power  structures  and  thus  limit  the  general  public's 
freedom and power of decision'? 
Is it ethically permissible to use genetic engineering to change a person's 
hereditary characteristics, e.g. by remedying a genetic deffect  '? 
What steps can be taken to ensure that the general public are informed 
critically, accurately and adequately about genetic engineering? GLOSSARY ESC 
Aerosol 
Amino acids 
Antibiotic resistance 
Antigens 
Antibodies 
Antibody count 
B.  subitilis 
(Bacillus subtilis) 
Bacteria 
Bacteriophages 
Cell differentiation 
Chromosomes 
Clone 
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Mist-like distribution of very fine droplets of 
liquid or solid particles in a gas, mostly in air. 
The  building  blocks of proteins.  There are 
twenty amino acids. They are joined one at a 
time, like beads on a string, as the final step in 
the  translation  of ON A's  genetic  message. 
Resistance of a  bacterium  to  the  deadly  or 
restrictive effect of an antibiotic. May occur 
through mutation in the genome of bacteria, 
but  usually  transferred  by  plasmids. 
Substances which can be identified as foreign 
by human beings or animals and are combat-
ted by antibodies. 
Substances  produced  by  animals or human 
beings to defend the body against antigens. 
Surveillance of the  type  and  number of re-
corded antibodies. 
Harmless  bacterium  found  in  the  soil. 
Small,  one-celled  organisms  with  a  single 
chromosome which is not enclosed in a nuclear 
membrane. 
Viruses  that  reproduce within  bacterial cells 
and  infect  new  cells  following  the  breaking 
open of the old ones. 
Process,  notably  in  embryo  development, 
whereby a basic cell is changed into cells with 
specific functions. 
Thread or rod-shaped elements in the nucleus 
of a  cell  which  harbour  hereditary  factors 
(nucleic acid). 
A  group of genetically  identical cells  or or-
ganisms asexually descended from a common 
ancestor. All cells in the clone have the same 
genetic material and are exact copies of the ori-
ginal. 114  GLOSSARY 
Disinfection 
Decontamination 
DNA 
(Deoxyribonucleic acid) 
Embryo development 
Enzymes 
E.  coli 
(Escherichia coli) 
Eukaryotes 
Gene 
Genome 
Genetic code 
Genetic expression 
Germ cells 
Hemorrhagic fevers 
ESC 
Destruction of micro-organisms through heat 
treatment  or  chemical  methods. 
Removal  of polluting  microorganisms  from 
working  surfaces,  premises,  containers,  etc. 
The genetic  material  found  in  all  living  or-
ganisms. Every inherited characteristic, every 
genetically  produced function,  has its  origin 
somewhere  in  the  code of each  individual's 
complement  of DNA. 
Typical development of an animal or human 
being  from  a  fertilized  egg  cell. 
Complex  protein  structures  which  trigger 
chemical  changes  in  living  cells. 
A harmless bacterium which occurs naturally 
in the intestine of human beings and animals. 
Organisms having cells containing a defined 
nucleus, multiple chromosomes, and a defined 
mitotic apparatus.  Eukaryotes can be  either 
unicellular (yeasts, protozoa) or multicellular 
(animal  and  plants). 
The smallest section of a chromosome which 
contains the hereditary information for a pro-
tein. 
The  sum  of all  the  genes  in  an  organism; 
corresponds to the chromosome in  bacteria 
or to the chromosomes in higher organisms. 
Alphabet of hereditary factors. The sequence 
of three nucleotides in  each case determines 
one  of  the  20  amino  acids. 
Process  in  which  genetic  information  is 
translated  into  a  product. 
Cells  produced  and  set  aside  early  in  deve-
lopment to produce sex  cells  or gametes.  In 
higher animals only changes produced in germ 
cells or their descendants can be transmitted to 
the  next  generation. 
Severe, often deadly viral infections which are 
accompanied  by  heavy  bleeding. ESC 
Hormones 
Host cells 
Hybrid 
Interferon 
Malignant degeneration 
Micro-organism 
Mutation 
Nucleic acid 
N ucleotides 
Pathogen 
Phenotype 
Plasm  ids 
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Highly active proteins which are formed in one 
place in a multi-celled organism and have their 
effect  in  another. 
A cell in which a virus grows and reproduces. 
In  recombinant  DNA experiments, the host 
cell  is  usually a  bacterium,  like  E. coli,  into 
which a  virus containing hybrid ON  A  is  in-
serted. 
Plant or animal resulting from a cross between 
parents that are genetically  unlike;  often  re-
stricted to the offspring of  two different species 
or of well-marked varieties  within a  species. 
Protein  liberated  by  cells  during  an  in-
fection  which  protects  other  cells  unspeci-
fically,  especially  from  a  virus  infection. 
Transformation  of a  normally growing cell 
into  a  cancerous  one. 
Microscopically  small  organism:  unicellular 
plant  animal  or  bacterium. 
Inheritable  change  in  the  genome. 
Basic  chemical substance  for  hereditary  in-
formation, long thread-shaped molecule from 
intertwined  nucleotides. 
Building blocks of  a nucleic acid, consisting of 
sugar, phosphate and one of  the following four 
organic bases: adenine, cytisine, guanine and 
thymine. 
Parasitic  organism  which  causes  disease. 
The characteristics of a  given  organism  re-
sulting from the expression of its genotype in 
development under particular environmental 
conditions. 
Ring-shaped n·ucleic acids in micro-organisms 
with  hereditary  information  which  multiply 
independently of the chromosome and can be 
exchanged  between  bacteria. 116  GLOSSARY 
Procaryote cell 
Protein 
Recombinant DNA 
Restriction enzymes 
RNA (Ribonucleic acid) 
Somatic cells 
"Shotgun experiment" 
Toxins 
Tumor viruses 
Vector 
Virus 
ESC 
The less complex cell type found in bacteria 
and  blue-green  algae.  To  be  distinguished 
from eucaryote cells, containing a membrane-
founded nucleus and found in all other orga-
nisms.' 
A large molecule composed of amino acids. 
Proteins, in structural and functional forms, 
are both building blocks and the catalysts for 
change  in  living  organisms. 
ON A molecules of different origin that have 
been joined  together  by  biochemical  tech-
niques  to  make  a  single  molecule,  usually 
circular and usually capable of some specific 
biological function, especially self-replication 
in  an  appropriate  cell. 
Enzymes  which  divide  nucleic  acids  up  at 
specific points determined by the sequence of 
their  nucleotides. 
In its three forms- messenger RNA, transfer 
RNA,  and  ribosomal  RNA  - it  assists  in 
translating the genetic message of DNA into 
the  finished  protein. 
The cells of which the body of  an organism is 
constructed, as opposed to the reproductive 
or  germ  cells. 
Use of random  nucleic acid segments of a 
genome in a genetic engineering experiment. 
Highly effective poisons formed  by  certain 
micro-organisms,  plants  or  animals. 
Viruses which can change a normal cell into a 
cancerous  one. 
A  vehicle  for  transmission  of a  replicative 
agent from an infected to a non-infected host. 
In  recombinant ON A, specifically a  plasmid 
or virus that can carry a foreign DNA into a 
host  cell. 
A  disease-producing  particle  consisting  of 
nucleic  acid  and  protein  which  can  only 
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